

EGYPT

1. PRESENTATION¹

Basic Facts: ²	
Name of Country	Arab Republic of Egypt
Capital	Cairo
Population	78,887,007 (July 2006 est.)
Area	1,001,450 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	71.29 years
Ethnic Groups	Egyptian 98%, Berber, Nubian, Bedouin, and Beja 1%, Greek, Armenian, other European (primarily Italian and French) 1%
GDP per Capita (PPP)	\$3,900 (2005 est.)

Community of Democracies	
Previous Participation	Warsaw: Participant Seoul: Observer Santiago: Observer

Timeline of Recent Major Events in Egypt

- **1981** October 6 – President Anwar Sadat is assassinated and Hosni Mubarak subsequently becomes Egypt’s new president.
- **1993** October 5 – President Mubarak elected by referendum to third term in office.
- **2004** December 12- First public protest by Kifaya group calling for an end to Hosni Mubarak’s rule.
- **2005** January 29 - Lawyer and political dissident Ayman Nour arrested on forgery charges (released on bail in March 2005).
- **2005** September 7 - Presidential election sees Mubarak reelected with 88% of the vote.
- **2005** December 1 - Last of three rounds of parliamentary voting; 11 demonstrators killed in clashes; the banned Muslim Brotherhood becomes the largest opposition party after its candidates win 88 seats.
- **2006** April 30 - State of emergency extended for an additional two years.
- **2006** May 18 - Presidential runner-up Ayman Nour’s five-year jail sentence confirmed.
- **2006** November - President Mubarak promises democratic and constitutional reform in an address to parliament. Opponents are skeptical.

¹ Principal author: Freedom House

² Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html>, accessed 8/3/2006.

EGYPT

2. BACKGROUND

Egypt formally gained independence from Great Britain in 1922 and acquired full sovereignty following the end of World War II. After leading a coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser established a repressive police state that he ruled until his death in 1970. The constitution adopted in 1971 under his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, established a strong presidential political system with nominal guarantees for most political and civil rights that were not fully respected in practice.

Following the assassination of Sadat in 1981, Hosni Mubarak became president and declared a state of emergency (which he has since renewed every three years, most recently in May 2006, this time for two years). Despite receiving enormous infusions of foreign aid, the government failed to implement comprehensive economic reforms. An economic decline in the 1990s led to an Islamist insurgency, but the state security apparatus cracked down on it and largely contained the conflict by the end of the 1990s.

Mubarak's regime demonstrated little appetite for reform until 2004, when a series of demonstrations against the United States-led war in Iraq evolved into anti-government protests. In an effort to recast himself as a reformer, Mubarak removed several "old guard" ministers from power and enacted a series of economic reforms. While opposition parties and groups continued to work toward a consensus on political reform throughout 2004 and 2005, calls for immediate change led some to take their demands to the streets. In December 2004, an informal movement encompassing a broad spectrum of secular and Islamist activists, calling itself *Kifaya* (Arabic for "enough"), held the first ever demonstration explicitly calling for Mubarak to step down.³

Egypt experienced a year of great political ferment in 2005. In January, the authorities arrested the country's most prominent secular liberal politician, Ghad Party chairman Ayman Nour, on charges of forging signatures in his party's petition for a license. In February, Mubarak publicly called for an amendment to the constitution allowing for Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election. The amendment, approved by parliament on May 10, restricted eligibility to candidates nominated by licensed parties or a substantial bloc of elected officials. Consequently, all major opposition groups denounced the amendment and called for a boycott of the May 25 referendum approving it.⁴

The presidential election campaign was characterized by open and contentious public debate, as well as by a forceful assertion of judicial independence. The Judges Club, a syndicate that represents 8,000 Egyptian judges, successfully pressured the authorities to permit more direct (if inadequate) judicial supervision of the voting, while the government's refusal to permit independent local monitors was overturned in court just hours before the election. Nevertheless, the results were predictably lopsided—Mubarak won 88 percent of the vote, while Nour, released on bail in March 2005, finished a distant

³ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

⁴ *Ibid.*

EGYPT

second with 7 percent. Three rounds of legislative elections, held in November, witnessed a strong showing by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which increased its representation in parliament fivefold. The notable gain in votes enjoyed by the MB alarmed the Mubarak regime, since the Islamist party became the largest opposition group in parliament, also winning more than half the races in which it fielded candidates.⁵

Turnout in both elections (and in the constitutional referendum) was under 25 percent. Violent attacks on opposition voters by security forces and pro-government thugs increased in the second and especially the third round of parliamentary elections, with hundreds of MB activists arrested and at least eleven deaths.⁶

The combination of strong support for the MB and the clear frustration of the electorate in general evidently put a scare into the Mubarak regime, for 2006 has witnessed serious setbacks for the Egyptian reform project. In March, a moderate party, *Wassat*, was denied a license to run for parliamentary seats. Additionally, local council elections that had been scheduled for 2006 were postponed for two years, likely as a result of fear of further MB gains.⁷ In April and May multiple anti-regime protests were dispersed through force, with the most serious occurring in Cairo on May 11, when police cracked down on a large group gathered to protest the arrest of two judges who had questioned the validity of the parliamentary elections. In October and December large numbers of MB members were arrested; the December crackdown focused on student groups who were accused of promoting violence during a demonstration at a Cairo university.⁸

On April 30 Mubarak extended the emergency law for an additional two years; the move, while unsurprising, was disappointing, as the leader had hinted in 2005 that the end of the state of emergency might be approaching. On May 18, presidential runner-up Ayman Nour lost his appeal and had his prison sentence of five years confirmed.⁹ Finally, harassment of the press continued; several publications were shut down and the government enacted a new law that failed to adequately protect journalists from the threat of arrest, fines, and jail terms. In an effort to demonstrate reform efforts, Mubarak proposed a host of constitutional amendments that will be put to a referendum in 2007. However, opposition members doubt that the amendments will increase plurality in a meaningful way and fear that they will actually result in decreased judicial independence.¹⁰ Opposition members were equally dubious regarding the plan to replace

⁵ "Country Report: Egypt", (London: *Economist Intelligence Unit* [EIU], May 2006), www.eiu.com.

⁶ "Amnesty International Annual Report 2006", (London: *Amnesty International* [AI]), <http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/1195E04B228C89968025716300496C24>, accessed 8/3/2006.

⁷ "US objects to postponement of Egyptian polls," *Agence France Presse*, 2/14/2006, accessed through Nexis 8/3/2006.

⁸ "Egypt: Police Intensify Crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood," *Human Rights Watch*, 12/18/2006, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/18/egypt14890.htm>, accessed 1/29/2007.

⁹ "Egypt: Violent attacks and arrests of peaceful protesters must stop," *Amnesty International*, 5/23/2006, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE120102006?open&of=ENG-2MD>, accessed 8/3/2006.

¹⁰ Gihan Shahine, "Devil in the Details," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 1/18/2007, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/828/eg6.htm>, accessed 1/29/2007.

EGYPT

the state of emergency with a new antiterror law.¹¹ All told, the wave of reform hopes, which crested in early 2005, has largely crashed in 2006 and early 2007, and few are optimistic about the current direction of Egyptian reform.

3. ANALYSIS

Elections and Democratic Participation

With the election reforms of 2005, presidential elections in Egypt shifted from an indirect, plebiscite-based system to a direct, competitive one. However, the process of electing the president, who appoints the prime minister, cabinet, and all 26 provincial governors, is not fully competitive. Article 76 of the constitution, as amended in May 2005, requires that after 2005 prospective presidential candidates belong to an active party which has won five percent of the seats in each house and can also secure the support of 250 members of parliament and municipal councils. Given the dominance of the National Democratic Party (NDP), these requirements are extremely onerous: as the law stands, no candidate outside the NDP will be eligible for the 2011 election; only the MB has the required share of parliament, but it is officially banned as a party. In January 2007 President Mubarak announced that a referendum would take place that would amend Article 76 as well as other articles to open more political space, but opposition members downplayed the reform potential of the proposed changes. The MB lashed out at the proposal to ban political parties that are based on religion, viewing it as a direct attempt to preclude any MB effort to register as a party.¹²

The 454-seat People's Assembly (*Majlis al-Sha'b*), or lower house of parliament, exercises limited influence on government policy, as the executive initiates almost all legislation. The partially elected upper house, the Consultative, or *Shura*, Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), functions only in an advisory capacity. As a result of government restrictions on the licensing of political parties, state control over television and radio stations, and systemic irregularities in the electoral process, legislative elections do not meet international standards. The state has also perfected the use of its vast patronage network to influence Egypt's single-member districts and maximize electoral gains.¹³

Owing mainly to closer judicial supervision of the polls and international pressure, presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005 witnessed substantially fewer allegations of massive fraud and violent intimidation than in preceding election cycles, but there were widespread irregularities in both, and international monitors were prohibited. The state used various channels of media manipulation to ensure a robust pro-Mubarak campaign on state television and various newspapers.¹⁴ The third round of parliamentary elections, conducted on 1 December 2005, occasioned the harshest crackdown, with

¹¹ Gamal Essam el-Din, "Political Landscapes," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 1/18/2007, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/828/eg5.htm>, accessed 1/29/2007.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads 2005* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)

¹⁴ "From Plebiscite to Contest? Egypt's Presidential Election," (Brussels: *Human Rights Watch* [HRW], 9/2/2005), <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt0905/index.htm>, accessed 8/3/2006.

EGYPT

thousands of voters denied access to polling places; in several places, chaos ensued when the security forces opened fire, leading to the aforementioned eleven fatalities. The judiciary battled with the Mubarak regime throughout 2005 over the ability to engage in proper and comprehensive monitoring of polling places. In April, the Judges Club declared that judges should be responsible for overseeing the process from voter registration through tabulating results;¹⁵ while this did not happen, the assertion of judicial prerogatives indicates a desire for greater judicial independence.

Political opposition remains weak and ineffective. A ban on religious parties prevents Islamist groups from organizing politically, although members of the MB compete in elections as independents. The Political Parties Committee (PPC), an NDP-controlled body affiliated with the Shura Council, can reject applicants for failing to offer a “unique and distinct program that enriches political life.” The Political Parties Law was slightly amended in 2005 to broaden the composition of the PPC.¹⁶ However, licensing of parties remains a highly capricious process; the May 2005 law gave the PPC the power to “freeze” parties if it is deemed “in the national interest” to do so.¹⁷

Rule of Law and Separation of Powers

Egypt’s democratic deficiencies often stem less from a lack of adherence to the law than from anti-democratic features contained within the laws. To be sure, existing statutes are often flouted, especially with regard to the conduct of the security forces. However, much of Egypt’s democratic deficit can be blamed on a massive imbalance of power between the executive and other branches of government. This results in a system in which bodies chosen in line with the prevailing laws are able to exercise power in arbitrary ways that lead to highly anti-democratic results. The PPC’s power to freeze political parties is an example of this phenomenon, as is the Emergency Law generally, as it essentially “freezes” the Constitution and allows President Mubarak untrammelled power.

The Egyptian parliament is a feeble body, and its reform is the *sine qua non* of democratic change.¹⁸ Even after the MB’s unprecedented gains in the 2005 election, the NDP still controls over 70 percent of the seats. With this ossified, rubber-stamping party in charge, parliament is unable to fulfill its proper role representing the people. It has also largely abdicated its oversight role, leaving the overmatched judiciary as the only check on government power. As the International Crisis Group puts it, a vicious circle obtains in which “the chronic weakness of the national parliament ensures the chronic weakness of the opposition parties and the permanent domination of political life at all levels by the executive and the NDP...”¹⁹ The sudden appearance in parliament of a sizable MB bloc may, however, change this dynamic, as the rise of a cohesive, prominent opposition party

¹⁵ “Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy,” (Brussels: *International Crisis Group* [ICG], 10/4/2005), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3718&l=1>, accessed 8/3/2006.

¹⁶ *Freedom in the World 2006*

¹⁷ “Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy,” *International Crisis Group*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

could potentially alter the current system of intermediation between civil society and the state.

An exception to the general democratic malaise is the judiciary, widely considered the most independent and impartial in the Arab world. The Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC), a supervisory body of senior judges appointed by the executive, nominates and assigns most judges. On 26 June 2006 Parliament passed a law acceding to demands that the judicial budget no longer be controlled by the Ministry of Justice, but leaving appointment power to the SJC in the hands of the president.²⁰ However, the April 2006 arrests of Mahmoud Mekki and Hisham Bastawisi for their criticism of irregularities in the 2005 elections was a troubling sign that the Mubarak regime was looking for ways to intimidate judges who act with independence.²¹ Opposition members noted that the proposed constitutional amendments of January 2007 would limit judicial independence and have a particularly deleterious effect on judicial monitoring of elections.²²

In July 2005 President Mubarak declared an ambitious reform agenda which included strengthening the parliament, checking the power of the executive, empowering local councils, and repealing the Emergency Law. However, given the subsequent backsliding, it remains to be seen whether substantive change will occur. In June 2006 Mubarak stated that 2007 would be a year of major reform progress, pushing back the date of reckoning yet again.²³ As noted, the proposed constitutional amendments of early 2007 were greeted with suspicion by opposition members.

Civil Liberties and Freedom of the Press

Freedom of assembly and association is heavily restricted. Organizers of public demonstrations, rallies, and protests must receive advance approval from the Ministry of the Interior, which is rarely granted. An unprecedented number of unauthorized pro-reform demonstrations took place during 2005 and into 2006, mostly without direct government interference. Police or plainclothes security agents forcibly dispersed several major demonstrations, often using violence as well as the new and alarming technique of sexual assault against female protesters.²⁴ The Law of Associations prohibits the establishment of associations “threatening national unity [or] violating public morals,” prohibits NGOs from receiving foreign grants without the approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs, requires members of NGO governing boards to be approved by the ministry, and allows the ministry to dissolve NGOs without a judicial order. Additionally, NGOs with explicitly political objectives are proscribed, as are links between NGOs and political parties.

²⁰ Maamoun Youssef, “Reformers say new judiciary law in Egypt doesn’t go far enough,” *Associated Press Worldstream*, 6/27/2006, accessed through Nexis 8/3/2006.

²¹ The two judges were acquitted, though Bastawisi received a reprimand. See “Country Report” (EIU).

²² Shahine, “Devil in the Details.”

²³ “Mubarak promises unprecedented reforms in 2007,” *Agence France Presse*, 6/22/2006, accessed through Nexis 8/3/2006.

²⁴ Ahdaf Souief, “Holding off collapse in Cairo: Every sector of Egyptian society is struggling with the government,” *Guardian Weekly*, 6/2/2006, accessed through Nexis 8/3/2006.

EGYPT

Freedom of expression is restricted by vaguely worded statutes criminalizing direct criticism of the president, the military, and foreign heads of state, as well as speech that is un-Islamic, libelous, harmful to the country's reputation, or disruptive to sectarian coexistence. In practice, imprisonment of journalists and closure of publications on these grounds has declined but not disappeared. In April 2005, three journalists for *Al-Misry al-Youm* were sentenced to one year's imprisonment for libeling a senior government official, though they remained free during the year. On 26 June 2006, the editor and a journalist for the opposition paper *al-Dustur* were sentenced to one year in prison each for reporting on a lawsuit against Mubarak and the NDP.²⁵ On July 10 the Egyptian parliament completed amendments to the Press Law which removed prison sentences for several offenses but maintained fines and possible jail terms for defaming the president or foreign leaders, among other offenses.²⁶ On October 31, opposition MP Talaat al-Sadat, the nephew of Anwar al-Sadat was sentenced to a year in prison for insulting the military after a television appearance in which he implied the assassination of his uncle was part of a military-political plot.²⁷ In January 2007, trial began for a blogger accused of inciting hate against Muslims and insulting the president.²⁸

Unidentified assailants have brutally assaulted (and in one case murdered) several journalists critical of the government in previous years. In November 2005, a journalist for Al-Jazeera satellite TV was beaten just prior to a scheduled interview with the leader of the opposition *Wafd* party.²⁹

The government encourages legal political parties to publish newspapers, but restricts the licensing of nonpartisan newspapers and exercises influence over all privately owned publications through its monopoly on printing and distribution. The three leading daily newspapers are state controlled, and their editors are appointed by the president. Several independent newspapers, such as the daily *Al-Masri al-Yom* (Egypt Today) and the weekly *Nahdet Misr* (Egyptian Renaissance), regularly publish criticism of the government. Foreign publications and Egyptian publications registered abroad (usually in Cyprus) are subject to direct government censorship. In March 2006 the MB's newspaper, *Afaq Arabia*, had its publication license revoked.³⁰ The government owns all domestic television and radio stations and also has a stake in satellite-based operations.³¹

²⁵ "Egypt: Journalists Still Risk Jail Under Press Law," *Human Rights Watch*, 7/11/2006, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/11/egypt13712.htm>, accessed 8/3/2006.

²⁶ "Egypt: New law still threatens press freedoms," (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], 7/12/2006), <http://www.cpi.org/news/2006/mideast/egypt12julyr06na.html>, accessed 8/3/2006.

²⁷ "Egypt: MP Jailed in Latest Attack on Free Expression," *Human Rights Watch*, 11/4/2006, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/04/egypt14504.htm>, accessed 1/29/2007.

²⁸ "Egypt: Drop Charges Against Blogger," *Human Rights Watch*, 1/27/07, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/27/egypt15192.htm>, accessed 1/29/2007

²⁹ "Egypt—Country Report on Human Rights and Practices 2005." U.S. Department of State, 3/8/2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61687.htm>, accessed 8/4/2006.

³⁰ "Country Report" (EIU)

³¹ "Country Report 2005" (State Dept.).

Arbitrary Arrest, Torture and Right to Fair Trial

Egyptian justice is systemically warped by the long-term application of the Emergency Law. The very concept of rights of the accused has been debilitated by twenty-five years of arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, prolonged pretrial detention, torture, and inadequate defense and appeals mechanisms.

The Emergency Law restricts many basic rights. It empowers the government to wiretap telephones, intercept mail, search individuals and places without warrants, and indefinitely detain without charge suspects deemed a threat to national security. Human Rights Watch reports that an estimated 15,000 people are currently detained without charge on suspicion of security or political offenses. Access to counsel prior to a defendant's appearance in court is uneven. Conditions in Egyptian prisons are very poor: prisoners are subject to overcrowding; lack of sanitation, hygiene, and medical care; and abuse and torture.³² Between May 2004 and July 2005 at least seventeen deaths occurred in custody.³³ Though torture is formally banned by the constitution, no member of the State Security Investigations Service has been prosecuted since 1986.³⁴

Security cases are usually placed under the jurisdiction of exceptional courts that are controlled by the executive branch and deny defendants many constitutional protections. The Emergency Supreme State Security Courts (ESSSCs), empowered to try defendants charged with violating decrees promulgated under the Emergency Law, issue verdicts that cannot be appealed except through presidential intervention, which is generally not forthcoming. Although judges in these courts are usually selected from the civilian judiciary, they are appointed directly by the president. Sentences are unduly harsh: On 18 June 2006, for example, two brothers convicted of drug trafficking and other charges were hanged after a trial before an ESSSC.³⁵ Civilians charged with security-related offenses can also be referred by the president to military courts. Since military judges are appointed by the executive branch to short, renewable, two-year terms, these tribunals lack independence. Verdicts by military courts are often handed down on the basis of little more than the testimony of security officers and informers, and are subject to review only by the president.

Minority and Gender Rights

Although non-Muslims are generally able to worship freely, religious expression considered deviant or insulting to Islam is subject to prosecution. In March 2005, Ibrahim Ahmad Abu Shusha was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for claiming to be divine, and 11 of his followers were sentenced to one-year prison terms. Anti-Christian discrimination is evident in public sector employment practices, especially the security

³² *Freedom in the World 2006*.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ "Country Report 2005" (State Dept.).

³⁵ "Egypt: Two brothers executed after unfair trial before an exceptional court," *Amnesty International*, 6/21/2006, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE120122006?open&of=ENG-2MD>, accessed 8/3/2006.

EGYPT

services and military, as well as in staff appointments and admissions to public universities.³⁶ The government frequently denies or delays authorization of applications to build and repair churches. Muslim extremists have carried out several killings of Coptic villagers and frequent attacks on Coptic homes, businesses, and churches in recent years. The government continues to deny members of the Baha'i faith a range of civil documents, including identity cards, birth certificates, and marriage licenses. Homosexuals are also subject to severe discrimination; many have been arrested and tortured solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.³⁷ Some cases against homosexuals have been conducted through the use of Emergency courts, compounding the rights violations against these citizens.

Although the constitution provides for equality of the sexes, some aspects of the law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. Unmarried women under the age of 21 are not permitted to obtain passports without permission from their fathers. A Muslim female heir receives half the amount of a male heir's inheritance (Christians are not subject to provisions of Islamic law governing inheritance matters). Domestic violence is common, and marital rape is not illegal. Job discrimination is evident even in the civil service. The law provides for equal access to education, but the adult literacy rate of women lags well behind that of men (34 and 63 percent, respectively).³⁸ Female genital mutilation is practiced on a large scale. Domestic violence is rife; one survey conducted in 2003 found that 67 percent of urban women and 30 percent of rural women had been the victim of domestic violence within the previous year.³⁹

4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The list of areas in which progress is required for Egypt to democratize further is lengthy and daunting. In effect, the relationship between the Egyptian state and Egyptian citizens must be fundamentally rethought before a serious democratic opening can occur. The current model, in which the state regards itself as a bulwark against the potentially destabilizing wishes of the citizenry, is incompatible with the basic idea of democracy. The entrenched system of executive-dominated governance must be extensively reworked, and individual rights must be strengthened.

Egyptian democracy is achievable if several changes are made. First, President Mubarak must repeal the Emergency Law. There can be no democracy until the executive's powers to monitor, detain, and prosecute under this law are halted. The Emergency Law places decision-making outside of the systems of checks and balances and accountability that are fundamental to democracy.

Secondly, relations between the various branches of government must be altered. Parliament must be given the power to assume its proper role. Elections should be based on proportional representation or a slate system; ideally, the constitution should be

³⁶ "Country Report 2005" (State Dept.).

³⁷ *Freedom in the World 2006*.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ "Country Report 2005" (State Dept.).

EGYPT

amended to install a system of parliamentary democracy.⁴⁰ Additionally, parliament should be able to issue votes of no-confidence as a means of imposing accountability on the executive.⁴¹ The Political Parties Committee should be abolished and the process of registering a party made far more open; additionally, the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood should be lifted and the party allowed to field candidates, including presidential ones, under its own banner, assuming it adheres to principles of non-violence.

An important side effect of a strengthened parliament is that it can act to protect the emergence of an independent judiciary. Extending the reach of the judiciary while ensuring its independence is critical for Egyptian reform. The judiciary has already demonstrated its eagerness to fulfill its responsibility of election supervision, and it should be provided the necessary resources to comprehensively supervise all elections, including local council ones, over which it currently lacks oversight power.⁴² Finally, the Supreme Judiciary Council should be comprised of members elected by their peers rather than appointed by the executive.

In terms of fundamental rights, as stated, the repeal of the Emergency Law is the single most essential element of reform. Once the Emergency Law is repealed (and assuming it is not replaced by draconian anti-terror legislation), the Mubarak regime will be obligated to operate under existing Egyptian and international laws. The ESSSCs should then be cancelled and the military courts constrained to their original purpose. The laws banning torture must be enforced, along with an end to extended pretrial and incommunicado detention.

There are several measures that can be taken to encourage greater freedom of expression. The government should immediately cease violent disruption of peaceful demonstrations. Additionally, the Press Law should be amended. Particularly onerous clauses such as Articles 179, 302, 303, and 308, which have the combined effect of criminalizing criticism of public officials and foreign heads of state, should be repealed immediately. Finally, the Law of Associations, which governs NGOs, should be amended to encourage the freedom of expression as channeled through civil society groups. NGO registration should be opened, and NGOs should be free from administrative harassment.⁴³

⁴⁰ Gamal Essam El-Din, "Parliament to tackle reforms," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 6/1/2006, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/797/eg4.htm>, accessed 8/4/2006.

⁴¹ As suggested in the platforms of several of Mubarak's opponents in the presidential campaign, see, for example, New Wafd Party leader Noaman Mohammed Khalil Gomaa's platform at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/PElection/election/Sheets/040202030000000002.htm>, accessed 8/4/2006.

⁴² Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy," (ICG)

⁴³ "Egypt: Civil Society Groups Severely Restricted," *Human Rights Watch*, 6/4/2005, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/04/egypt11217.htm>, accessed 8/3/2006.

EGYPT

5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Egypt Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	18.4	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	21.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	43.1	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	34.7	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	54.6	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	43.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Egypt Score	Key
Political Rights	6	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Status	NF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free) / (*) Indicates electoral system

Countries at the Crossroads 2005	Egypt Score	Key
Accountability and Public Voice	2.31	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak accountability and public voice; higher value indicates strong acc. and p.v.)
Civil Liberties	2.18	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak civil liberties; higher value indicates strong civil liberties)
Rule of Law	3.19	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Anticorruption and Transparency	1.76	Range 0-7 (Lower value indicates weak anticorruption and transparency; higher value indicates strong a-c and transp.)

Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Egypt Score	Key
Total Score	61	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

EGYPT

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Egypt Score	Key
Stateness	7.3	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	3.3	
Rule of Law	3.8	
Stability of Democratic Institutions	2.0	
Political and Social Integration	4.3	
Total Score Political Transformation	4.12	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑ Improved; ↓ Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	3.88	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Egypt Score	Key
Total Score	3.3	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)

6. SOURCES

Books and Reports:

- Amnesty International, *Egypt: Report 2006*, available online at <http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/egy-summary-eng>.
- Human Rights Watch, “*From Plebiscite to Contest? Egypt’s Presidential Election*,” 9/2/2005, available online at <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt0905/index.htm>.
- International Crisis Group “*Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy*,” 10/4/2005, available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3718&l=1>
- U.S. Department of State, “*Egypt—Country Report on Human Rights and Practices 2005*,” 3/8/2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61687.htm>.
- Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads 2005*
- Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006*
- Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2006*
- Economist Intelligence Unit, “*Country Report: Egypt*”, May 2006, available online at www.eiu.com.

Journals, Magazines, and Online Sources:

- Al-Ahram Weekly Online- <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/index.htm>
- All Africa- <http://www.allafrica.com/>
- BBC- <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

EGYPT

- CIA World Factbook- <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>
- New York Times- <http://www.nytimes.com>
- The Economist www.economist.com