

YEMEN

1. PRESENTATION¹

Basic Facts ²	
Name of Country	Yemen
Capital	Sanaa
Population	21,456,188
Area	527,970 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	62.12 years
Ethnic Groups	Predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asians, Europeans
GDP per capita,PPP	\$4,700

Community of Democracies	
Previous Participation	Warsaw: Participant Seoul: Observer Santiago: Observer

Timeline of Major Events in Yemen³

- **1990** - Unified Republic of Yemen proclaimed, after North and South Yemen reunite, with Ali Abdullah Saleh as president.
- **1993** August - Vice-President Ali Salim al-Baid withdraws to Aden, alleging that south is being marginalized and that southerners are being attacked by northerners.
- **1994** July - Northern forces take control of Aden; secessionist leaders flee abroad and are sentenced to death in absentia.
- **2000** October - US naval vessel USS Cole damaged in suicide attack in Aden which is subsequently blamed on al-Qaeda; seventeen US personnel killed.
- **2001** February - Violence in run-up to municipal polls and referendum, in which voters support constitutional reform extending presidential term and powers.
- **2003** April – Parliamentary Elections are held; the General Popular Conference wins the vast majority of seats, with the Congregation for Reform the only opposition party to make significant gains.
- **2004** June-August - Government troops battle supporters of dissident cleric Hussein al-Houthi in the north; estimated deaths range from 80 to more than 600.
- **2006** September – President Saleh wins re-election to a fifth term; opposition candidate wins 22 percent.

¹ Principal author: Freedom House

² Source: CIA World Factbook at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>, accessed on August 4, 2006.

³ “Timeline, Yemen” *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1706450.stm, accessed August 22, 2006.

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2. BACKGROUND

As part of the ancient Minaean, Sabaean, and Himyarite kingdoms, Yemen has a long history stretching back nearly 3,000 years. Yemen was divided into two countries—the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)—which ultimately unified in 1990 after decades of conflict and tension. Despite widespread poverty and illiteracy, tribal influences that limit the central government’s authority in certain parts of the country, a heavily armed citizenry, and the threat of radical Islamist terrorism, Yemen has managed to take some limited steps to improve its record on political rights and civil liberties in the 14 years since unification.⁴

In 1999, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled North Yemen from 1978 to 1990 and continued leading the country after the 1990 unification, renewed his mandate for a five-year term in Yemen’s first nationwide direct presidential election, gaining 96.3 percent of the vote. Saleh’s only opponent came from within the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC). His term in office was extended from five to seven years in a 2001 referendum. In an April 2003 parliamentary election, the GPC again took a large majority in the government. International election observers noted that Yemen had made substantial improvements in electoral management and administration, although there were reports of problems with underage voting, confiscation of ballot boxes, voter intimidation, and vote buying

In June 2004, clashes broke out between government forces and supporters of Hussein Badreddin al-Hawthi, a prominent cleric in Yemen’s Zaydi community in the northern region of Saada. Al-Hawthi, who formed an opposition group called *Shabab al-Moumineen* (Believing Youth), had become strongly critical of the Yemeni government’s relationship with the United States, accusing the government of taking actions to please the United States at the expense of the Yemeni people. Hundreds of people were reportedly killed in the clashes in Saada, prompting several human rights organizations to call for inquiries into reports of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and incommunicado detentions by government forces. Al-Hawthi was killed in September 2004, but the clashes between his supporters and government forces continue. In addition to clashes in Saada, Yemen continues to face challenges in maintaining law and order from groups with links to international terrorist organizations.⁵

Yemen continues to be plagued by serious economic problems, including widespread poverty. The United Nations Development Program ranks Yemen as No. 151 of 177 countries on its Human Development Index.⁶ More than 40 percent of Yemenis live below the poverty line, and economic growth has been slow. In March 2005, Yemen experienced two days of demonstrations over the introduction of a sales tax.

⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ “A struggle for Peace in a Place Where Fighting Never Ends” *The Washington Post*, December 19, 2005. Accessed through Nexis on August 21, 2006.

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Several events since the Santiago Ministerial have marred Yemen's recent human rights record. An escalated crackdown on press freedom in 2005 and 2006 led to statements from NGOs condemning "the ongoing campaign of harassment and intimidation...and the hostile climate of fear that the independent press are forced to work in."⁷ The outcry was in reaction to numerous reports of prominent journalists intimidated, beaten, and arrested by government security forces. Also detrimental to Yemen's civil rights credentials was its handling of July 2005 riots protesting gas prices. Approximately 43 Yemenis, including a 12 year old girl, were killed in riots when the price of fuel increased by approximately 100 percent because fuel subsidies were lifted as part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform program.

In July 2005, President Saleh, in a speech marking 27 years of his rule, shocked the country by announcing that he would stand down when his current term of office expired. However, despite earlier comments endorsing political reform and a changeover in government, in June 2006 Saleh reversed his position and announced his candidacy for elections scheduled for September. Saleh won the elections with just under 80 percent of the vote. A European Union election observation mission described the election as an "open and genuine political contest" but noted a number of "serious shortcomings" such as incidences of voter intimidation, underage voting, and the use of government funding to support Saleh's campaign. Opposition parties, which won 22 percent of the vote according to official tallies, alleged fraud and irregularities in the counting of the vote, but accepted the result.

3. ANALYSIS

Elections and Democratic Participation

Citizens of Yemen cannot change their government democratically. On the surface, Yemen appears to have a relatively open democratic system, with citizens voting for the president and members of parliament. In reality, Yemen's politics is monopolized by the ruling party, the GPC, which has increased the number of parliament seats it holds from 145 in 1993 to 237 in the current parliament. Yemen's government suffers from the absence of any real system of checks and balances of power and any significant limits on the executive's authority.⁸

Yemen's April 2003 parliamentary election took place despite concerns that popular unrest resulting from the war in Iraq might lead to a postponement. International election observers noted that Yemen had made substantial improvements in electoral management and administration. To an extent, the elections were competitive, with the opposition Islah party taking seats in constituencies that were former strongholds of the ruling party.

⁷ IPI Condemns harassment and Intimidation of Yemeni journalists" *International Press Institute*, http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/statements_detail.html?ctxid=CH0055&docid=CMS1146234674788&year=2006, Accessed on 20 August 2006.

⁸ *Freedom in the World 2006*.

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However, there were numerous problems with the election. Voter registration involved widespread fraud, and underage voting posed a ubiquitous problem.⁹

During the campaign, the election administration placed limits on the issues candidates could raise and the presentations they could make in televised campaign statements. A single member of the Supreme Committee for Elections and Referendum (SCER) was the final decision maker on what candidates could and could not say during televised appearances, with no opportunity for appeal.¹⁰

International and domestic election monitors and Yemeni unions noted that the ruling GPC party used state resources to influence the outcome of the vote. For example, in certain parts of the country, government officials threatened teachers with transfer or the loss of their jobs if they did not help the GPC in its campaign. In addition, international election monitors noted that elements of the ruling GPC employed “heavy-handed and coercive measures” on election day.¹¹ Although provisions exist in the law for public financing for campaigns, parties are also permitted to raise unregulated funds from private donors, a system that numerous analysts believe favors the ruling party. In addition, the GPC reportedly manipulates votes by arranging for military troops to vote in particular constituencies, even if they are not residents there.¹²

Article 62 of the constitution and Sections 24 and 53 of the Election Law require that the populations of all constituencies be equal in size, with a variation of not more than plus or minus 5 percent. Nevertheless, as drawn, the boundaries of electoral constituencies do define populations of unequal size. In addition, according to independent domestic election monitors, the judiciary did not thoroughly and carefully review election disputes; it responded to 56 separate complaints in the post-election period, taking only three days to issue its ruling, which prompted complaints that the merits of different election disputes were not carefully considered. Although local council members are popularly elected, the 2000 Law on Local Authority allows for the appointment of the chairpersons of local councils by the president. In practice, the chairpersons hold the preponderance of power in the local councils, and the Local Authority Law does not grant substantial decision-making authority to the council members.¹³

In the September 2006 elections, the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) fielded a candidate for the first time. Faisal bin Shamlan, a former member of parliament, announced his candidacy on July 8. The presence of an opposition candidate, as opposed to previous elections in which Saleh’s only challenger came from within the GPC, resulted in considerably more competitive presidential elections than those in 1999, although there were several instances of violence, and monitors noted some irregularities.

⁹ “Preliminary Statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Yemen’s April 27 Legislative Elections” (Washington, D.C.: *National Democratic Institute for International Affairs* [NDI], 29 April 2003), 4, http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1584_ye_election03.pdf, accessed 3 July 2006.

¹⁰ Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

¹¹ “Preliminary Statement of the NDI,” 1.

¹² *Countries at the Crossroads 2006*.

¹³ *Ibid.*

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The announcement of a JMP candidate came against a backdrop of increasingly reinvigorated and more confident domestic political opposition. In November 2005, a number of opposition groups unveiled a program, entitled the “Agenda for Reform” aimed at building a more effective opposition bloc to deal with the long standing power of the government.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the GPC won comfortably in the September elections with approximately 80 percent of the vote, and minority parties are still at times suppressed. Many believe that Saleh’s son, Ahmed, is being groomed to succeed him when his current term expires in 2013.

Rule of Law

Despite efforts in recent years by the Yemeni government to reform the judiciary and enhance its capacity, the court system remains the weakest link of the three branches of government, susceptible to interference from the executive branch and unable to implement its rulings in many parts of the country.¹⁵

In theory, Yemen’s judiciary is independent. Article 149 of Yemen’s constitution states that “the judicial authority is an autonomous authority in its judicial, financial, and administrative aspects, and the General Prosecution is one of its sub-bodies. Judges are independent and not subject to any authority, except the law.” In practice, however, Yemen’s Judicial Authority Law, which provides further definition of how the judiciary is managed, includes provisions that some legal analysts and civil society leaders argue contradict the constitutional safeguards of the judiciary’s independence. Article 104 of this law assigns the president of the republic to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which manages the affairs of the judiciary. In addition to the president, the minister of justice, the deputy minister of justice, and the head of the judicial inspection board, who reports to the minister of justice, all serve on the SJC. These provisions legally enable the executive to maintain a strong degree of control over the judicial branch. More specifically, under the judicial authority law, the ministry of justice has a number of powers that constrain the judiciary’s independence—supervising the finances, administration, and organization of the courts; reassigning judges and authorizing them to take non-judicial jobs; selecting the number of members in the Supreme Court and courts of appeal; and defining the location and selecting the jurisdiction limits of primary courts.¹⁶

In addition to this most basic issue of limits on judicial independence, the judiciary suffers from a lack of adequate resources, which hinders its ability to hire and train qualified judges and implement its rulings. In rural areas, Yemenis frequently rely on traditional tribal forms of justice. A judicial reform move increased the salaries of judges as a measure to eliminate corruption, but this has not proven to be a panacea for the problem of judges taking bribes.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *Countries at the Crossroads 2006*

¹⁶ Jamal Al-Adimi and Faisal Asswfi, “Justice Report: Yemen 2000,” *Al-Qistas* (FCS, 2000), 7.

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In January 2005, the SJC appointed 25 new judges, dismissed 22 judges without compensation and benefits, ordered more than 100 judges into early retirement, and moved several judges to different positions in an attempt to advance judicial reforms further. In addition, the Higher Judicial Council appointed 24 people to the Judicial Inspection Commission, a body that monitors the performance of judges. The new appointees included Abdullah Farwan, former chairman of the Central Organization for Control and Audit. These changes represented one of the largest shifts under a judicial reform program begun with support from the World Bank in 1997.

Yemen's law provides citizens with the opportunity for a fair and public trial and guarantees access to independent counsel. There were, however, reports of two trials which did not meet international standards of fairness in 2005 and 2006. In the two trials, one man was sentenced to death and two are currently awaiting execution. Article 47 of the constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by final judicial ruling, and no law may be enacted to put a person on trial retroactively for acts committed. In practice, however, these principles are often undermined by the detention of suspects for long periods of time without trial. Article 48 of the constitution prohibits arrests made without warrant issued by a judge or prosecutor. On the other hand, government crackdowns since 2003 have often seemingly ignored the law in practice, with claims of national security overriding personal rights.

The Ministry of the Interior oversees the criminal investigative department of the police, which conducts most criminal investigations and arrests. The Ministry of Interior also maintains oversight of prison conditions for the 10,348 inmates detained in Yemen as of September 2003. Prison conditions remained poor, with reports of unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and a lack of access to medical care.¹⁷ Unlike many other countries in the Arab world, Yemen does not have state security courts. However, the political security office (PSO), Yemen's primary internal security force, operates under the control of the president, with little or no oversight from other parts of the executive branch, the parliament, or judicial authorities.¹⁸

The military is under the control of the executive branch. Nonetheless, tribal disputes and the prevalence of guns in society present a constant threat to the rule of law. Home to 21 million people and approximately 60 million guns, Yemen faces a constant struggle to alleviate tribal violence, particularly in rural areas such as Al Jawf, Marib, and Shabwa, which are frequently home to intense tribal conflict.¹⁹ Recent efforts to settle tribal disputes have had little success. Rule of law in rural areas can be exceptionally weak, as justice is often dispatched through revenge killings in a cycle of violence difficult to break. Almost all rural court cases are settled out of court with tribal mediators. There

¹⁷ "Kenya; Ordeal in Yemen," *Africa News*, 20 September 2004, Accessed through Nexis, 10 July, 2006.

¹⁸ *Countries at the Crossroads 2006*

¹⁹ "A struggle for Peace in a Place Where Fighting Never Ends" *The Washington Post*, December 19, 2005. Accessed through Nexis on August 21, 2006.

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have also been reports of several unauthorized private prisons in rural areas, despite government efforts to close them down.²⁰

Civil Liberties

Yemen's constitution offers protections against arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, but it is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Yemen's government has stepped up efforts to reduce the incidence of torture, but violations continue, in part due to a lack of adequate training and awareness among law-enforcement officials. Since the Santiago Ministerial, there have been reports of torture and arbitrary arrest, violent suppression of protests, discrimination towards women and minorities, and police brutality. Women's rights also remain severely restricted.

During 2005, hundreds were killed in armed clashes between security forces and followers of members of the Zaydi community still loyal to al-Hawthi and the Shabab al-Moumineen movement. In March, authorities launched a search for al-Hawthi followers in Sa'da province, leading to intense fighting and 400 deaths over a two week period. Reportedly, dozens of al-Hawthi supporters were detained without charge or trial. In September, in an effort towards reconciliation with the Zaydi community, President Saleh pardoned and released 627 Hawthi supporters. The prisoner release was reportedly part of an undisclosed peace deal between the grandson of al-Hawthi, Abdulmalik al-Huthi, and the government.²¹ While violence did decrease following the amnesty, the sustainability of the deal was challenged in early April when soldiers killed an al-Huthi supporter and wounded two others. A build up of Yemeni troops in the area throughout 2005 and 2006, and reports that support for Zaydi community is growing both domestically and in neighboring countries, contributed to raised tensions and fear that the ceasefire may collapse.²²

In the summer of 2005, following a 100% rise in gas prices, widespread rioting broke out across the country. Rioters burned pictures of government representatives, smashed stores, and burned cars in cities across the nation, including Hudaydah, Aden, and the capital, Sanaa. In response, government security forces deployed tanks and troops throughout the streets. The government accused the opposition of fomenting the violence, a claim resolutely denied by opposition parties. As the violence escalated, the military surrounded government buildings in anticipation of direct attacks on the government. There were reports that the military fired into the crowd, launched tear gas, and beat rioters with batons.²³ Protesters responded by pelting them with stones. Clashes between government forces and rioters led to 43 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The conflict lasted almost a week in total.

²⁰ "Yemen: Country Reports on Human Rights and Practices, 2005" *U.S. Department of State*, March 8, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61703.htm>, Accessed August 19, 2006.

²¹ "Yemen: Country Report May 2006" The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ "16 Killed in Riots in Yemen" *Western Mail*, July 22, 2005, Accessed through Nexis August 24, 2006.

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Although the law prohibits torture while in detention, members of the Political Security Office (PSO) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) police forces regularly tortured and abused prisoners. Security forces often act with impunity in such cases, as all public employees are immune from prosecution for crimes allegedly committed while on duty. The attorney general must provide special permission to prosecutors to investigate allegations against members of the security forces, and the head of the appeals court must lift the immunity before the accused is tried. Torture was a particular problem in PSO prisons, which are not monitored by government agencies. In July 2006, 19 terror suspects were acquitted when their confessions were judged to be insufficient evidence to convict them. During the trial, defense lawyers maintained that confessions had been tortured out of the suspects. It is widely assumed that Yemen is one center in the US rendition program, in which US authorities covertly turn individuals over to foreign governments for interrogation that likely involves torture.

In a recent encouraging development, from February to October 2005 the government, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), trained over 340 MOI officers on the illegality of torture. Under the initiative, a human rights guide was prepared and distributed to MOI officers. In the first week of July, 360 female officers completed similar training. The MOI, in conjunction with the Ministry of Human Rights (MHR), also intensified its monitoring of prison conditions around the country

Women are afforded most legal protections against discrimination and provided with guarantees of equality. In practice, however, women continue to face pervasive discrimination in several aspects of life. A woman must obtain permission from her husband or father to receive a passport and travel abroad. Unlike men, women do not have the right to confer citizenship on a foreign-born spouse, and the process of obtaining Yemeni citizenship for a child of a Yemeni mother and a foreign-born father is in practice more difficult than that for a child born of a Yemeni father and a foreign-born mother. Honor killings, in which a woman is assaulted or killed for perceived immoral behavior, receive leniency in trials. It is possible for a man to kill his wife and her lover and receive less than a year in prison. Female genital mutilation, while not widespread, is still occasionally practiced.²⁴

Press Freedom

Although the constitution provides for freedom of the press, the overall legal framework regulating the press is weak. Article 103 of the Press and Publications Law prohibits direct personal criticism of the head of state, and the penal code provides for fines and imprisonment for publishing “false information” that “threatens public order or the public interest.” The weakness of Yemen’s judiciary and lack of clarity about who has the power to interpret the meaning of vague laws affecting the press create an environment in which journalists do not feel secure in their freedom to criticize the government and freely debate issues, resulting in self-censorship. The Ministry of Information controls most of the printing presses in the country and provides subsidies to many newspapers. The state enjoys a monopoly on domestic broadcast media, which has

²⁴ *Freedom in the World 2006*

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a wider impact than print media because of the high rates of illiteracy in Yemen, and generally prevents reporting critical of the government.²⁵

The situation confronting journalists—threats of violence and death, as well as arbitrary arrest by police and security forces—has worsened significantly since the Santiago Ministerial. In the spring of 2005, security forces in the Taiz and Al-Dale governorates beat up several journalists, including Mohammad Abdu Sufian, editor of *Taiz* newspaper, and Mohammad Mohsen al-Hadad, general manager of *Taiz* Radio and Television. In August, Jamal Amer, editor of *Al-Wasat* newspaper, was abducted and beaten by armed men who said they were acting on behalf of military officers intending to warn him against future criticism of the government. Government security forces ransacked the office of Associated Press journalist Ahmed Alhaj, taking files and a computer. In October, police beat a television crew from the Arab satellite channel *Al-Arabiya* that was covering a strike by textile workers in Sanaa. *Al-Thawra*, the government-run daily newspaper, ran several editorials in 2005 accusing reporters critical of the government of being foreign intelligence agents. However, in November *Al-Thawra* itself was fined over US\$5,000 and had two of its reporters banned for six months for defamation of a government official. In April 2006, journalist Abdulfatah al-Hakimi suffered respiratory problems after an attack in which two unidentified men sprayed gas into his car. Hakimi had criticized the appointment of government ministers earlier in the year. In November 2006, newspaper editor Kamal al-Aalafi was sentenced to a year in jail for reprinting Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammad.

A new draft media law that would abolish jail terms for journalists who criticize the president is currently under parliamentary debate; however, critics point out that separate provisions in the law could severely restrict journalists in other ways and could be used to silence opposition to the ruling party prior to the upcoming presidential election.²⁶

4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Since the Santiago Ministerial, press freedom has arisen as the most significant issue requiring attention in Yemen. In order to address the root of current problems, the Yemeni government should amend the Law for Press and Publications to clarify or delete the numerous vaguely worded provisions on outlawed publications in Articles 137 to 153. The current draft law being debated by parliament should be amended and clarified to ensure the press freedom and greater public debate so essential in a democratic system. Further, the government should abolish the Ministry of Information and set about developing procedures and regulations to enable the establishment of private and independent broadcast media outlets in order to reduce the state's monopoly on radio and television.

²⁵Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2006* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

²⁶“Yemen: Journalists still targeted despite draft law” IRINnews, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53069&SelectRegion=Middle_East, accessed August 24, 2006.

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In order to strengthen the political process and root out corruption at the polls, the government should establish special mechanisms to expedite the dispute resolution and appeals process at all stages of the election cycle, either by further developing the capacity of the SCER to rule or by setting up special and independent electoral courts to arbitrate disputes in a timely, thorough, and cost-effective manner.

In light of the arbitrary arrest and detention prevalent in the 2005 crackdown on Zaydi militants, and the violent suppression of protests in summer 2005, the Yemeni government should implement a comprehensive program to train law enforcement, security, and prison officials in the proper procedures for arresting, detaining, and interrogating accused individuals. Public officials should not have immunity for crimes committed while on duty.

The government should amend national laws to ensure that women enjoy full equality in the law, particularly personal status laws on obtaining citizenship. Laws that criminalize domestic violence against women should also be introduced, eliminating any lenience towards perpetrators of honor killings. Furthermore, the government should work closely with civil society organizations to develop support structures such as shelters and counseling services to assist women who are victims of violence.

5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Yemen Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	21.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	7.1	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates the opposite)
Government Effectiveness	18.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak govt. effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	21.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	13.0	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	34.0	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Yemen Score	Key
Political Rights	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Status	PF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free) / (*) Indicates electoral system

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Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Yemen Score	Key
Total Score	81	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads 2006	Yemen Score	Key
Accountability and Public Voice	2.64	Range 0-7 (Lower Score representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)
Civil Liberties	3.35	Range 0-7 (Lower Score representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)
Rule of Law	2.88	Range 0-7 (Lower Score representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)
Anticorruption and Transparency	1.93	Range 0-7 (Lower Score representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Yemen Score	Key
Stateness	5.8	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	4.5	
Rule of Law	3.8	
Stability of democratic Institutions	2.0	
Political and Social Integration	4.3	
Total Score Political Transformation	4.07	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑Improved; ↓Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	3.87	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Yemen Score	Key
Total Score	2.6	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)

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