

ARMENIA

1. PRESENTATION ¹

Basic Facts ²	
Name of Country	Republic of Armenia (Armenia)
Capital	Yerevan
Population	2,976,372
Area	29,800 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	71.84 years
Ethnic Groups	Armenian 97.9%, Yezidi (Kurd) 1.3%, Russian 0.5%, other 0.3%
GDP per capita, PPP	\$4,500

Community of Democracies	
Previous participation	Warsaw 2000: Participant Seoul 2002: Observer Santiago 2005: Observer

Timeline of Recent Major Events in Armenia:

- **2005** May – Armenian parliament adopts amendments to the country’s electoral law, increasing the number of seats to be elected by party list or proportional system, reducing the power of the president to appoint members of the Central Election Commission, and establishing a new national voter registry system.
- **2005** May – Revisions to Armenia’s Law on Demonstrations are adopted by parliament, broadening the rights of assembly and the freedom of expression.
- **2005** September-October – Local elections praised by Council of Europe observers as an improvement from past elections, although election monitors from local NGOs condemn voting irregularities and blatant intimidation of candidates.
- **2005** November – A national referendum adopts proposed constitutional amendments which seek to reduce the powers of the executive and increase those of parliament. Questionable figures show turnout at 64 percent, with slightly more than 93 percent of participants endorsing the amendments.
- **2005** December – Larisa Alaverdian, the country’s presidentially-appointed human rights ombudsman, is forced to resign and is subsequently prevented from presenting her official report to the Armenian parliament.
- **2006** March – The leadership of a small Armenian opposition party led by a former foreign minister are evicted from their offices by the authorities following the seizure of records and computer equipment. The eviction follows a public confrontation with the Armenian president in December 2005.
- **2006** May – The Armenian parliamentary speaker Artur Baghdasarian is forced to resign after a clash with the president, resulting in the withdrawal of his Orinats

¹ Principal author: Bertelsmann Foundation

² Source: *CIA World Factbook* at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/am.html> (accessed on July 21, 2006).

ARMENIA

Yerkir (Country of Law) Party from the ruling three-party coalition and sparking a series of defections of ministers and parliamentarians from his party.

- **2006** July – The Armenian defense minister is formally named as a new senior leader of the Republican Party, fueling speculation that he will stand as the party's candidate in the 2008 Armenian presidential election.
- **2006** July – A new package of legislative reforms of the judicial and law enforcement systems is submitted to the Armenian parliament by the justice minister. The reform package seeks to reduce the powers of the court of appeals and the office of the prosecutor general, and includes a new draft Judicial Code.

2. BACKGROUND

Compared to other former Soviet states, Armenia is endowed with distinct advantages in several important areas that are necessary for the fulfillment of institutionalized democracy. Most notably, these advantages include a tradition of multiparty, pluralistic politics, with an abundance of parties expressing a variety of views, and a stable civil-military relationship, with the armed forces led by a civilian minister and fully accountable to an elected government. Yet these advantages are neither secure nor sufficient, as serious shortfalls in the rule of law, the holding of free and fair elections, and a lack of good governance continue to plague the course of Armenian democracy.

Armenian democratic development is stagnating. Overall, there is no firm evidence of a resolute advance in Armenian democracy, particularly in light of structural shortcomings in the institutions of governance. Over the past year and a half, however, there has been some progress with potential for future developments. This progress has centered on the adoption of legislative measures aimed at improving the country's electoral reforms, expanding the rights of peaceful assembly and, most importantly, a national referendum that ratified a set of constitutional amendments seeking to delineate a more balanced form of governance. More recently, a package of proposed judicial reforms have also been submitted to parliament intending to bolster the structural reforms to the judiciary contained in the new changes to the Armenian constitution.

The legislative accomplishments and the constitutional amendments of the past year and a half offer a significant sense of potential for a deepening of Armenian democracy. This potential remains a fairly distant promise, however, as the country faces several serious obstacles rooted in a rigidly closed political system, enforced by a tendency for electoral irregularities, entrenched corruption, and a weak and arbitrary rule of law. The key question for Armenian democracy lies in whether the recent achievements of legislative reforms and positive structural changes from the amendments to the constitution will be followed by additional measures. If there is any hesitation or lessening in the political will and determination needed to carry this dynamic democratic process forward, then it seems likely that Armenia will be destined to return to its past cycle of static democratization.

ARMENIA

But the true significance of Armenia's recent legislative reforms and constitutional changes stems as much from their implementation as from their adoption. There is a real danger that the effectiveness of these democratic reforms will be hostage to the indifference or even defiance of the Armenian political elite. With an Armenian population generally cowed into a political apathy exacerbated by a political system that has tended to deny it both voice and choice, the likelihood of popular pressure for reform seems remote. Therefore, the adoption of constitutional and legislative reforms actually demonstrates the need for Armenia to be held to an even higher standard, with the implementation of these democratic reforms serving as a crucial test. The imperative rests not just on the scale and scope of the reforms, but on how the Armenian government and the political elite respond to the necessity of carrying them out. So far, the record remains bleak; implementation of the reforms has stalled since 2006.

3. ANALYSIS

The two most fundamental shortcomings in the course of Armenia's democratic development, a pronounced lack of free and fair elections and a seriously weakened rule of law, have long served as the country's most formidable obstacles to reform. While correcting the deficiencies that have defined Armenia's electoral record for many years is especially pressing as the country faces another election cycle within the next two years, it is the absence of a resilient rule of law that presents the more daunting challenge for Armenia. It is against this broader backdrop that developments in Armenia since the April 2005 Santiago Ministerial can be most effectively judged.

Elections/Referendum

Over the past year and a half, Armenia has become increasingly concerned with preparations for a new round of elections, with parliamentary elections set for May 2007 and an election for a new president slated for sometime in 2008. While the looming election cycle has fostered a degree of increased political activity, with the formation of several new political parties, a change in the composition of the governing three-party parliamentary coalition, and a resurgence of tactical alliances, all this has been contained within the country's narrow, closed political system. This has further distanced the ordinary population from the ruling political elite, widening an already serious divide between governed and governing exacerbated by general apathy and distrust. The Armenian government has done far too little to address, or even recognize, these issues.

Armenia has a troubled record of elections, with international observers routinely noting problems in vote counts, voting irregularities and voter intimidation. But the country has held multiparty elections in a timely and legally defined manner, with each contest open to all candidates that meet the legal requirements for registration regardless of political affiliation and little demonstrable evidence of political violence. Each of these elections, despite their other violations, has been held by secret ballot with equal and universal suffrage.

ARMENIA

In addition, there have been some positive developments recently. Most notably, the Armenian parliament adopted several key amendments to the country's electoral code in May 2005. These changes were designed to correct some of the problems that arose in past elections and, in conformity with the recommendations of the Council of Europe, sought to limit the presidential power to appoint members of the electoral commissions, both local and national, and reduce the opportunity for voter fraud by creating a new national database or registry of the country's eligible voters, thereby ending the previous practice of simply relying on the use of Soviet-era identification cards. The adopted reforms to the electoral law also increased the number of parliamentary seats to be elected by party list, or proportional system, from 75 to 90, and lowered the number of single-mandate seats elected on the majoritarian system from 56 to 41. This change represented an attempt to reduce the incidents of electoral corruption and the practice of "vote buying" in parliamentary elections.

The reforms further introduced more detailed regulations governing the compilation and release of official voting results. Such an improvement was deemed necessary to reduce the delay in releasing results, as the longer the lag time in publishing official figures, the more opportunity for vote count tampering. Other reform measures included improvements to the processes of filing and hearing of campaign-related complaints and appeals, and the enhancement and expansion of the rights of candidate proxies and electoral observer teams in polling stations. This latter move was especially important for opposition observers and proxies who have faced outright intimidation in the past.

A final element of the May 2005 set of electoral code amendments focused on the problematic composition of electoral commissions. Specifically, by reducing the number of presidentially appointed members of both the Central Electoral Commission and the 56 district commissions from three members to one, the reform aimed at minimizing the potential for undue presidential influence over the nominally independent electoral commissions.

Since the May 2005 adoption of important electoral reforms, progress in meeting the requirements for holding free and fair elections, however, has been mixed. In contrast to the promise of the new electoral code provisions, the local elections held in September and October 2005 demonstrated ongoing concerns regarding implementation of more democratic standards. The local elections were subject to greater scrutiny than previous local contests, stemming in part from a greater interest in assessing the new electoral reforms. The election was marred by an organized boycott by the opposition, although there was a greater degree of truly competitiveness.

Several Armenian NGOs reported widespread bribery, blatant "vote buying" and inaccurate voter lists. But international observers deployed by the Council of Europe found the election "satisfactory" and "generally in keeping with the Council of Europe's electoral standards."³ Observers also noted significant improvement in the elections over

³ "Congress delegation declares local elections in Armenia generally satisfactory and calm", Council of Europe release, October 17, 2005 at <http://www.coe.int/NewsSearch/Default.asp?p=nwz&id=7231&lmLanguage=1>. (accessed on September 11, 2006, link currently inactive).

ARMENIA

past ballots and an improved commitment by electoral officials to institute and follow the newly revised regulations. In one of the first direct tests of the newly enacted electoral reforms, a Yerevan court ruled in favor of a challenge to the official local election results and reinstated the victory of an independent candidate.

Less than two months after the election, initial optimism on progress was watered down by an indication that the coming elections may continue to be marred by voting irregularities and fraudulent ballot tabulation. Such an indication arose from both the conduct and verdict of the national referendum on a set of proposed amendments to the Armenian constitution in November 2005. In terms of the conduct of the referendum, the Armenian government engaged in a blatant campaign to exert significant pressure on the population to adopt its proposed constitutional amendments. The referendum also reflected the divisions within Armenian politics, as the country's opposition parties were strongly opposed to the constitutional changes, arguing that the government's draft proposals were too insufficient and limited in scale and scope to achieve true reform.

Given the fact that the draft amendments were formulated entirely by the government, and because of the fact that the opposition was seeking an open confrontation over the issue, an enthusiastic campaign for their passage was natural. But the government went too far by leveraging the power and influence inherent in the state apparatus and using state resources to unduly pressure and possibly intimidate voters. For example, municipal officials routinely issued orders and directives to teachers, lesser state officials and some civil servants to actively lobby for the passage of the referendum. Teachers were compelled to instruct students and their parents on "the merits" of the proposed constitutional changes. Additional examples of the use of state resources included the use of television and state-affiliated media to broadcast no-cost government-sponsored advertisements advocating passage of the referendum, while opposition parties encountered serious problems in attempting to pay for television and radio airtime.

Thus, in the lead up to the actual vote, the constitutional referendum quickly assumed an unexpected significance well beyond the context of political reform. As the government adopted an aggressive campaign for the adoption of its proposals, and the opposition sought to engage the state in a direct confrontation, the referendum became much more of a test for the government than a milestone of reform. The government also faced pressure to ensure that there would be no repeat of the failure of the country's last national referendum on amending the constitution. The results of that vote, held in May 2003, were annulled after the minimum number of voters required for its passage failed to even participate. The structure of the referendum, which was a rigid "up or down" vote on the entire package rather than individual reforms, only tended to raise the stakes for the government.

Despite this heightened politicization of the referendum, and partly because of the government's assertive campaign for passage, the general public remained profoundly disengaged from the issue. The apathy was reflected in public opinion polls. One of the more objective survey firms, the Vox Populi center in Yerevan, found in a survey conducted in early November 2005 that a mere 54 percent of respondents intended to

ARMENIA

participate in the referendum, with 46.6 percent of those indicating that they would vote in favor.

The proposed reforms offered an important opportunity for instituting significant structural changes to the Armenian system of governance. Several versions of the set of amendments were formulated in conjunction with experts from the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, which defined the final draft proposals as a vehicle to provide a "good basis for ensuring...respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and would pave the way to further European integration."⁴ Most relevant for Armenia, the changes to the constitution aimed at forging a more balanced distribution of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.

The most notable proposals addressing structural changes to power included measures that would end the power of the president to appoint the prime minister, would impose a new requirement that the mayor of the Yerevan capital be indirectly elected by an elected municipal council rather than appointed by the president, and would replace the presidential appointment of the Council of Justice, which serves as a supervisory and disciplinary body within the judiciary, with an election by members of the judiciary. Additionally, access to the country's highest judicial body, the Armenian Constitutional Court, which interprets and enforces basic law and ensures the constitutionality of legislation, would be broadened to provide ordinary citizens with the right to challenge the constitutionality of legal provisions applied against individuals.

After the heated campaign for passage by the government and an organized boycott by the opposition, the actual vote on the referendum was largely a letdown as the official announcement showing a massive yes vote was generally accepted as no surprise. But although the passage of the referendum was widely seen as a foregone conclusion, especially given the intensity of the government's campaign for its passage, the official results sparked widespread skepticism. The results, which reported that the constitutional referendum had been approved by an overwhelming 93.2 percent of some 1.5 million voters, with a voter turnout of 65.4 percent, stood in stark contrast to the media reports and televised coverage of the vote that showed virtually empty polling stations.

The figures fueled speculation that the Armenian government resorted to vote count manipulation to ensure the referendum's passage. However, there was also a sense of public indignation over the scale of manipulation, interpreted as an insult to the public's intelligence and to the voter's integrity. The reaction was confirmed by the findings of a delegation of monitors from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that reported observing ballot-box stuffing first hand and counted few voters. Even the country's parliamentary speaker at the time, Artur Baghdasarian, challenged the

⁴ Nichol, Jim, "Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Recent Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests", Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, July 24, 2006, p. 9; PACE, "Constitutional Referendum in Armenia: General Compliance Marred by Incidents of Serious Abuse", November 28, 2005.

ARMENIA

government in December 2005 by alleging “serious ballot-stuffing” during the referendum vote.⁵

There are two specific trends that are revealed in the wake of the Armenian constitutional referendum, with each related to the growing pains of the country’s democratic development. First, it reveals a deeper trend that spans the issue of electoral conduct to include the broader state of the rule of law. For Armenia, both the formulation and passage of the constitutional reforms demonstrate an important step forward. Yet the conduct of the referendum, including the vote itself, does little to counter concerns over the country’s coming cycle of parliamentary and presidential elections. Ironically, the poor performance in the referendum’s voting process may actually lead to even greater scrutiny and the imposition of a higher threshold of democratic standards for the next elections in Armenia.

The second trend stems from considerations of the efficacy and commitment of the government to both confirm and conform to the new constitutional measures that have effectively rebalanced the distribution of power in Armenia. This is particularly pressing as the current Armenian president is constitutionally prevented from running for a third term in 2008, which means that the successful implementation and the subsequent enforcement of the new constitution will rest on a new leader. And it is here that the issue of political will and commitment comes into play, as the country’s next leader will need to demonstrate a firm political will capable of carrying out democratic reforms that may at times directly challenge the vested interests of the very same political system that put him into power.

Democratic Institutions and Rule of Law

The closed nature of the Armenian political system, impeded by entrenched corruption, makes it difficult to leverage the public support, pressure and engagement necessary for real democratic reform. Voter apathy and a general public perception of government as a system rooted in an “arrogance of power” have fostered an environment of distrust and disgust among the Armenian polity. This is also seen in the striking contrast between Armenia’s robust and active civil society and its inability to become an effective agent of change capable of holding the government more accountable to the standards of democracy.

Evidence of the closed nature of Armenian governance is also demonstrated by several recent developments. In December 2005, Armenia’s presidentially appointed human rights ombudsman, Larisa Alaverdian, was forced to resign from her post following a heated confrontation with the government over its decision to evict residents from a central part of the Yerevan capital to make way for new residential developments. Alaverdian criticized the eviction as a flagrant violation of the residents’ property rights and exposed several cases of police harassment against some residents who protested the

⁵ Bedevian, Astghik, “Parliament majority leaders opposed to referendum fraud inquiry,” RFE/RL Armenia Report, January 20, 2006 at <http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2006/01/4e56c518-06fa-45a8-b364-c3de7dd31b39.asp> (accessed on September 7, 2006).

ARMENIA

eviction and lodged formal complaints in May 2005. The incident escalated to include a police raid on the offices of the human rights ombudsman, suggesting that there was little tolerance for criticism from within the political system. Although one of the recently adopted constitutional amendments altered the ombudsman selection process from a presidentially to a parliamentary appointed position, Alaverdian was quickly replaced in December 2005 by a member of the presidential staff. And prior to the end of her term as the country's first human rights ombudsman, she was prevented from even presenting her official closing report to the Armenian parliament.

A separate incident in May 2006 confirmed the rigid rules of the closed Armenian political system. After an open dispute with senior government officials that included a clash with the president, Armenian Parliamentary Speaker Artur Baghdasarian was forced to resign from his post, resulting in the withdrawal of his Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) Party from the ruling three-party coalition and sparking a series of defections of ministers and parliamentarians from his own party. Although not publicly acknowledged, the dismissal was seen as linked to the speaker's outspoken remarks condemning voting irregularities in the December 2005 referendum on the constitutional amendments. This also revealed that the ruling elite could easily enforce their own closed rules and punish dissent from any quarter, no matter how influential or publicly visible. In practice, there has been a significant narrowing of the avenues to political power. There has been a marked trend toward strengthening the institutions of state power and authority at the expense of opportunities for any emerging rivals from a more populist, grassroots level. This trend has been matched by a lack of any social movement or campaign and an absence of any attempts by civic groups to impose transparency, accountability and good governance in Armenia.

The executive branch is unquestionably the strongest and most dominant branch, while the judiciary can best be described as overly compliant to the demands of the executive, and the parliament as generally ineffective. Officially, an independent judicial branch does exist in Armenia. In reality, however, the Armenian judiciary is hostage to the will of the executive branch and is directly affected by widespread corruption. The judiciary is subject to a further degree of intimidation and outright control, through direct appointment of judges by the executive.

Human Rights

Reflecting the noticeable decline in basic civil freedoms in recent years, the Armenian media has been subject to a troubling pattern of state control and intimidation. Although freedom of the press and speech are guaranteed, the government maintains an overt monopoly over television and radio broadcasting. The main strategy of state influence over the media has been to adopt the tactics of economic pressure and arbitrary control of state licenses for media outlets. It has also fostered a practice of self-censorship and a general timidity among journalists to investigate or expose cases of wrongdoing among the ruling elite.

ARMENIA

Overall, the state of the Armenian media remains marked by a dominant state-run broadcast and print media, set against a financially vulnerable and harassed opposition or independent media. While new legislation to improve media independence was passed, the Armenian media climate has not improved and violent attacks on journalists continue. This trend of media intimidation was also encouraged by several disturbing policies implemented by the Armenian government in recent years. The most blatantly repressive policy centered on the punitive legal measures concerning “insulting the dignity and honor” of elected officials, a legal framework providing strict parameters that effectively curtails media coverage and analysis of the local and central government.

Restrictions on press freedoms and cases of outright intimidation have combined to further inhibit an Armenian media already weakened by severe declines in circulation and purchasing power of the average consumer. The fundamental fragility of the media on the whole has also encouraged the rise of the now dominant, private outlets owned by the new wealthy elite closely associated with the ruling political elite. And this lack of alternative or dissenting media has significantly stilted political reforms and efforts at democratization, a crucial shortcoming for a state in transition. These obstacles and dangers facing the Armenian media have also minimized the effectiveness of the media playing an important role in the fight against corruption.

Protection of fundamental human rights are not seen as primary issues of concern in Armenia, although there have been isolated incidents that have attracted international attention. There have been cases of torture and mistreatment by state officials, albeit isolated cases without any evidence of a systemic pattern or practice, as well as the imprisonment of conscientious objectors to compulsory military service.

4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

One of the most daunting obstacles to forging a lasting commitment to democratic standards in Armenia centers on the fragility and impotence of its institutions. There has been a significant achievement in this area within the last year and a half. Several key structural constitutional amendments have been adopted that will bring greater balance to the system of governance. What is needed in the coming months, however, is a resolute commitment by the government to implement these reforms. In addition to this institution-building effort of enforcing the political “checks and balances” roles of a strong parliament and an independent judiciary, strengthening the rule of law is just as crucial. For institutions to be leveraged as the building blocks of true democracy, they must be backed by a strengthened rule of law. The rule of law must also go beyond the political to incorporate social and economic justice in Armenia.

In this sense, the absence of such effective institutions and the resulting weak regulatory framework have allowed a pattern of flagrant abuse and excess to emerge relatively unchallenged by the authorities. This lack of institutionalization is especially evident in terms of economic regulation and enforcement, and has permitted the emergence of a new class of economic elite in Armenia. This new elite, the so-called

ARMENIA

“oligarchs,” have steadily acquired economic power at the expense of both society and state power, depriving the state of both tax revenue and national assets.

The emergence of such oligarchs as a new political elite has allowed them to extend their informal networks of control through informal, cartel-based semi-monopolies. The best way to combat such monopolistic abuses is through anti-trust legislation. The legislation, however, must be backed by the political will to exercise and enforce it to restore a natural equilibrium to the course of democratic reform. In the case of Armenia, this new class of oligarchs has tended to exploit the privatization process to gain economic power, but with an appetite for political power that inherently threatens the course of democratization and political reform. The threat is also to the system itself, as such practices fuel corruption, weaken the rule of law and deprive the state of legitimacy. The key to overcoming this challenge is to focus on the broader campaign against corruption, with the rule of law (and political will) again playing a crucial role. Measures needed include the development of a regulatory framework to tackle the economic monopolies and cartels. In Armenia, given the small size of the national economy, transparency and competition can be very effective.

A second requirement for Armenian democracy is the need for reforms that can address the mounting inequalities in the society. Specifically, the development of a vibrant middle class is vital, beyond measures simply promoting economic entrepreneurship and commercial activity. The development of a middle class is dependent on two important factors, one short-term and another long-term. The first prerequisite for the emergence of a vibrant middle class is one of access and opportunity. The structure of the society as a whole, and its economic and political systems in particular, must not be closed or divided between a small wealthy and powerful elite and a much larger impoverished and marginalized majority.

Once in place, a middle class generally represents the interests of society as a whole, rather than for any small ruling elite. It is this advocacy role that buttresses political and economic reform, empowers civil society and encourages the political will for deeper democratic reform. There is also a “trickle down” effect, with the middle class both serving and strengthening a civil society, free press and eventually a responsible political opposition.

5. STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Armenia Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	30.4	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	38.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	49.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)

ARMENIA

Regulatory Quality	56.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	41.5	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	33.5	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Armenia Score	Key
Political Rights	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	4	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of civil liberties; higher value indicates bad system civil liberties)
Status	PF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Armenia Score	Key
Total Score	64NF	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2006	Armenia Score	Key
Electoral Process	5.75	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates strong electoral process; higher value indicates weak electoral process)
Civil Society	3.50	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates strong civil society; higher value indicates weak civil society)
Independent Media	5.50	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates strong independent media; higher value indicates weak independent media)
National Democratic Governance	5.00	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates strong democratic governance; higher value indicates weak democratic governance)
Judicial Framework and Independence	5.00	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates strong and independent judiciary; higher value indicates weak and corrupt judiciary)
Corruption	5.75	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates low level of corruption; higher value indicates high level of corruption)

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Armenia Score	Key
Stateness	8.8	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	6.0	
Rule of Law	4.3	
Stability of Democratic Institutions	6.0	
Political and Social Integration	5.5	

ARMENIA

Total Score Political Transformation	6.10	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑Improved; ↓Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	5.08	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Armenia Score	Key
Total Score	2.9	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)

6. SOURCES

Media:

- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
- RFE/RL's Armenian Service (Armenia)
- Eurasianet (US)
- Jamestown Monitor (US)
- Armenian Media (print media: Azg, Yerkir, Noyan Tapan, Arminfo, ArmeniaNow)

Human Rights Organizations/Civil Society:

- Human Rights Watch
- US State Department Human Annual Report on Rights Practices
- Amnesty International
- UN Human Development Report
- Open Society Institute (Armenia)
- National Democratic Institute (US)
- Freedom House

International Organizations in Armenia:

- OSCE Office in Yerevan
- United Nations (Armenia offices)