



Japan

Assessment: Fair

Trend: ↑

Capital: Tokyo

Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy with a Parliamentary Government

Head of Government: Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (since 24 April 2001)

Foreign Minister: Yoriko Kawaguchi

Population: 126,771,662

Human Development Index Ranking 2002: 9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overall, Japan has a **fair** record of support for democracy abroad. Japan has at times quietly tried to persuade leaders of non-democratic regimes to return to democracy, and has provided financial and humanitarian assistance to help build functional legal, administrative and law enforcement systems abroad. However, it has consistently chosen to let concerns for democratic development abroad take a back seat to what it considers more important interests – commercial, political and security.

The willingness and ability of the Japanese government to speak and act in support of democracy is shaped and constrained by several of its deeply held beliefs, as well as concerns for its other national interests. The Japanese government believes, for example, that democracy cannot be secured without economic development and social stability and, therefore, it has pursued policies and programs designed to help strengthen national economies over support for democracy. In addition, Japan believes that “quiet diplomacy” is often more effective than open condemnation. Finally, consideration of other national interests has, at times, constrained Japan’s support for democracy abroad. This has been especially true in the Middle East, the source of most of Japan’s oil, and Southeast Asia, where increasing Chinese influence has been Japan’s primary concern.

FOREIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUND

Official Japanese statements hold that the spread of democratic institutions and regimes will contribute to stability across the world.¹ Japanese officials recognize that promoting democracy and respect for fundamental human rights have become important issues for the global community. Thus Japan has participated in international efforts to promote democracy both multilaterally and bilaterally. However, Japan has also frequently adopted policies of bilateral engagement toward non-democratic regimes, especially when responding to democratic crises. This approach of engagement has frequently raised doubts about Japan’s intentions or seriousness in this endeavor.

Japan’s limited approach to democracy promotion is due in part to its contention, informed by its own national experience, that economic development is an indispensable precondition for democratization. According to this logic, sustained economic growth will facilitate changes and reforms in social and political systems, like an expanded middle class, and help the public develop democratic norms. Since these types of changes generally take a relatively long time, Japan tends to seek and tolerate long-term solutions. In Japan’s thinking, “democracy and political freedom cannot be achieved overnight.”² This position is based on a firm belief that, without economic development, the social foundation for democracy would remain fragile. Japan learned this lesson through its own bitter experience before World War II, when in the face of the global economic depression of the late 1920’s, emerging democracy in Japan gave way to the rise of militarism.³

A second explanation for Japan’s unwillingness to condition its relations with non-democratic regimes on improved respect for human rights grows out of Japan’s role as a model for economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia have long sought



to emulate the Japanese economic system -- at least until the early 1990's when the Japanese economic bubble burst. Having observed Japan's "economic miracle" under strong, centralized leadership, these countries came to believe that centralized governance would best support their own economic development.⁴ Thus, many leaders in the Asia-Pacific region chose more authoritarian structures as a way to free themselves from the demands of various interests groups and the general public. Japan has been sympathetic to these leaders because their countries had relatively short periods of self-governance after they were liberated from colonial rule and faced numerous challenges in their transitions to modern statehood. Few had functional administrative systems and most faced threats of communism and domestic unrest throughout the period of the Cold War. Thus, Japan tolerated and even supported these authoritarian regimes as they sought to achieve economic and social stability.

A third reason for Japan's policy of engagement is that, in Japan's view, social or political instability in the Middle East or Southeast Asia could run counter to Japan's national security interests. As a result, Japan's support for democratization in these regions has been cautious or non-existent.

Japan typically has engaged in "quiet diplomacy" rather than open condemnation of the leaders of target countries.⁵ Japan believes that economic sanctions are more effective if they are imposed without humiliation, particularly with regard to the countries of Southeast Asia, and that in some cases sanctions can induce confrontations and cause leaders to become more defensive and less inclined to open up their countries. These cases are, in their view, most likely to occur when leaders are proud and xenophobic nationalists, as is the cases of Burma and Indonesia.⁶ In sum, from Japan's perspective, accommodation can be more effective than pressure.⁷

Japan's foreign policy has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). In the future, however, changes in Japan's domestic politics might decrease its influence and affect the key assumptions in Japan's policy to support democracy abroad. For example, the number of NGOs engaged in supporting democracy and economic development abroad has been increasing rapidly and they have become more willing to criticize Japan's external policy, particularly its policy of official development assistance to repressive regimes.

RESPONSE TO OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

Overall, Japan's record with regard to the overthrow of democratically-elected governments has been modest but good. Over the past decade, Japan has responded to coups in Haiti, Nigeria, Fiji and Pakistan. Its responses have included open expressions of regret, suspension of economic aid, and the initiation of diplomatic efforts aimed at persuading coup leaders to return to democracy.

In response to the 1991 coup in Haiti, for example, Japan froze its official development assistance (ODA) until President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored in 1994. After 1995, Japan resumed its ODA to support the new democratic regime, held a series of training seminars for Haitian officials, and dispatched foreign ministry officials to oversee elections in Haiti.⁸ Similarly, in response to the military government in Nigeria, Japan suspended all new economic cooperation, except for urgent humanitarian aid.

Japan denounced the coup in Fiji in 2000 as regrettable, announced its support for ousted President Mara, and expressed its continued hope for democratization.⁹ Japan extended emergency assistance to the United Nations Development Program to assist with the fair and smooth implementation of the general elections in August-September 2001, and dispatched staff members to support the elections.¹⁰

In response to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan, Japan launched a diplomatic initiative aimed at persuading General Musharraf to keep his pledge to hold the planned general election in October 2002. Japan did not impose economic sanctions -- it had already suspended most of its official development assistance in response to Pakistan's nuclear weapons testing in 1998 -- but its position as one of the largest donors of economic assistance to Pakistan, and one of its largest trading partners, gave it some leverage in this effort.¹¹ More specifically, the Japanese government used the visits of high-ranking Japanese officials and politicians to Pakistan to continue to put pressure on Musharraf to hold democratic elections.¹²

RESPONSE TO MANIPULATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Overall, Japan has a mixed record when confronted with obvious cases of flawed electoral processes abroad. For example, Japan actively worked to push the government of Cambodia to hold democratic elections, and has provided



electoral monitoring assistance to facilitate democratic elections in a number of countries around the world. In addition, Japan enforced economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and froze the funds of the Yugoslavian and Serbian governments in Japan in 2000 when the new Kostunica government replaced Milosevic's regime.¹³ On the other hand, it stood by former Peruvian President Fujimori after he resigned in disgrace in 2000, and failed to respond to the 1997 manipulation of the election process in Malaysia.

Japan exercised some leadership in efforts to broker democratic peace in Cambodia in 1993, and has been the largest donor of economic assistance to Cambodia ever since.¹⁴ In 1997, when the Second Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen expelled and took over the position of the First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh Sihanouk by force, Tokyo avoided calling the expulsion a "coup," accepted Hun Sen's new position and played a significant role in arranging the planned 1998 election.¹⁵ Japan regarded Hun Sen's action as a "necessary evil" that would help preserve the fragile peace in Cambodia.¹⁶ While Ranariddh was certainly forcibly removed, Hun Sen did not make any substantial change to Cambodia's principal governance system, including the constitution, the constitutional monarchy, and the framework of coalition government. Thus Japan, in coordination with the French government, focused its high-level diplomatic initiatives on persuading Hun Sen to hold the 1998 national elections and on allowing Ranariddh to return to Cambodia to participate in them.¹⁷ Eventually, Hun Sen accepted this position, and, despite some independent observers questioning the violent pre- and post-election atmosphere, on 26 July 1998 what are generally considered to be free and fair elections were held throughout Cambodia.¹⁸

With regard to Burma, the official Japanese approach has been one of "engagement and dialogue" requiring "patience and persistence."¹⁹ Initially, when the military junta refused to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988, Japan joined the West in criticizing the military regime and froze its economic assistance to Burma. Privately, however, Japan's policy toward Burma was torn between conflicting interests.²⁰ As one analyst noted, Japan looked for "ways to continue economic support for Rangoon without breaking openly with the United States and European Union."²¹ As time went by, Japan took the view that international sanctions were failing to promote democratization in Burma because they

pushed the military junta toward a more defensive posture, which resulted in the cessation of economic and democratic reforms.²² Perhaps more importantly, the Japanese government was at this time concerned with the increasing Chinese economic and military influence in Burma.²³ The government felt that, in order to promote political reconciliation between the military government and Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters, economic stability had to be established as a precondition for political stability.²⁴ Thus, Japan resumed limited economic aid to Burma.²⁵ Additionally, under close diplomatic coordination with ASEAN, Japanese leaders have continued their diplomatic offensive to persuade the leaders of Burma's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to return to democracy.²⁶ In 2002, while Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from house arrest, Burma's top generals maintained their position that the SPDC would restore democracy at its own pace and in its own way.

In Peru, Japan initially played a constructive role in responding to the 1992 *autogolpe* by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. However, it failed to support democratization in other ways, particularly since 2001. Japan is the largest donor of economic assistance to Peru and actively assisted the Fujimori administration.²⁷ Since Fujimori was a Japanese immigrant to Peru, Japan enjoyed special access to him, and Fujimori himself paid a visit to Japan every year, officially or unofficially. After the 1992 *autogolpe*, a senior Japanese foreign ministry official handed Fujimori a letter from the Japanese Prime Minister, urging him to create a plan for democratization before the Organization of American States (OAS) conference was convened.²⁸ Patiently, through quiet diplomacy, Japanese officials and politicians attempted to persuade Fujimori to restore democracy. Subsequently, Japan also dispatched electoral observation missions and provided financial support for the OAS's monitoring of national elections.²⁹ When President Fujimori fled to Japan in November 2000 to escape a dramatic corruption and governance scandal, he claimed that he had Japanese citizenship and announced that he would remain in Japan. Despite the new Peruvian government's repeated pleas to Tokyo to extradite Fujimori so he can stand trial for a series of crimes, the Japanese government has taken the position that it is now obliged to protect his rights as a Japanese citizen, a move viewed by others as providing a safe haven for an alleged criminal.



PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Japan's primary tool for supporting democracy abroad is its official development assistance (ODA). The 1992 ODA Charter states that in providing economic assistance, "full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a market-oriented economy and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country."³⁰ Japan risked a contradiction in the Charter, however, when it provided economic aid to non-democratic countries such as China and Burma. Moreover, Japan's ODA policy has been criticized as allocating too much toward building hard infrastructure as compared to initiatives for developing democratic institutions and systems.³¹ This policy is currently under thorough review, and Japan is expected to shift the target areas of its ODA from hard infrastructure to education, poverty reduction, and the environment.

At the 1996 Lyons Summit, Japan introduced a new policy framework of "Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD)" to assist developing countries in building functional legal, administrative and law enforcement institutions, and in expanding human resources for democratization and better promotion and protection of human rights.³² Japan has also established another new policy framework of "Human Security" in order to better jointly promote economic development, social stability, and democracy. The definition of Human Security remains somewhat broad, but in general it aims to protect individuals from the problems that threaten human lives, livelihood, and dignity. For this purpose, Japan has created a Human Security Fund at the United Nations Secretariat.

POLICY TOWARD ENTRENCHED DICTATORSHIPS

Japan has openly expressed regrets about human rights violations by entrenched dictatorships. At the same time, however, Japan has pursued an engagement policy toward these dictators by providing them with development assistance and by pursuing quiet diplomatic interactions with them. This approach has been especially evident in Japan's policy toward China (the People's Republic of China), North Korea, Iraq, and Cuba.

Japan normalized relations with China in 1972, and has become the largest donor of economic aid to that country.³³ Japan believed that this development assistance would support China's

economic development, and that this would in turn facilitate political reform. Japan has almost always emphasized the importance of supporting Chinese economic development on the grounds that economic growth would eventually soften the regime's posture on political liberalization.³⁴ Japan has also tolerated human rights violations in China and declined to isolate the Chinese regime. As the Chinese economy and defense budget have been growing, however, there has been a mounting sense of insecurity in Japan regarding the future of China.³⁵ It remains to be seen whether, as Japan shifts its target areas of economic aid from public works to environmental protection, support for good governance, and poverty reduction, it will begin to place more emphasis on democratization in its policy toward China.

Japan regards North Korea as a source of grave security threats.³⁶ Japan's policy toward North Korea has been framed in terms of "carrots and sticks," a combination of engagement and deterrence. The most important "carrot" is the possible normalization of bilateral relations that would ensure a massive flow of economic assistance to North Korea.³⁷ In close coordination with the United States, South Korea and the European Union, and with support from the broader international community, Japan signed its first joint declaration with North Korea at its first bilateral summit meeting in September 2002. This was widely viewed as a constructive step in inducing Pyongyang to soften its external policy and reform its economy.³⁸

More than 90 percent of Japan's oil imports come from the Middle East. As a result, Japan places a higher priority on stability than on democracy in this region – indeed, Japan has avoided support for democratization out of fear it could produce uncertain outcomes that might disrupt Japan's oil imports. Japan maintained a close relationship with Iraq for several decades until the early 1990's, but has supported international sanctions against that country since the 1992 Gulf War.³⁹ While Japan clearly condemns Iraq's violations of the UN Security Council resolutions, it views the U.S. Government's policy of regime change in Iraq as too ambitious.

Japan has adopted an active engagement policy toward Cuba to expose it to "outside air," and has built close relations with high-ranking Cuban political figures. However, Japan has also openly expressed regrets with regard to its human rights record.⁴⁰ Japan has held a series of bilateral political dialogues with Cuba, and frankly discussed



their concerns about Cuban human rights violations. Japan has taken a “carrot” approach to its dealings with Havana by emphasizing that improvements in human rights conditions would enhance Japan’s

interest in Cuba, and urged Havana to take measures to promote democratization.⁴¹ Cuba expressed its intent to continue bilateral dialogues with Japan on these issues.

¹ Japan’s primary foreign policy objectives include: protecting the homeland; maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia; protecting the sea-lane of transportation; sustaining economic growth by promoting open-market economic systems globally; combating global problems including poverty reduction, environmental degradation and transnational crimes; promoting arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons and related-materials and technologies; and promoting good governance and democracy as well as protecting human rights and freedom throughout the world. Given its geographical proximity, Japan has especially focused on developing and sustaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

² Nishihara, Masashi. Crisis in “Myanmar and East Timor: The Case for Japanese-American Cooperation.” a lecture note from an Asian Voices Seminar of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. 6 Oct. 1999. p. 5.

³ In 1920’s, Japan’s democracy remained “immature” because it suffered significantly from a series of corruption scandals, while politicians and government officials were almost incapable of dealing with the rapid expansion of poverty in rural areas throughout the country. When the public’s trust in democratic government eroded, military seized the opportunity. See, Kitaoka, Shinichi. Seitou kara Gunbu he (Transition of Power from Political Parties to Military before WWII). Japan: Chuou Koron Shinsha, 1999.

⁴ Iwasaki, Ikuo. Ajia Seiji wo Miru Me (Perspectives on Politics in Asian Countries) Japan: Chuko-Shinsho, 2001. pp. 155-178.

⁵ Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4. In this article, Nishihara lays three cases where sanctions usually work effectively: 1) when sanctions hurt the elite, not the people; 2) when sanctions are targeted at certain specific areas, such as arms sales, military training, or certain economic practices; and 3) when sanctions are enforced in concert with the entire international community without any room for competitors to take advantage of sanctions.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6. Another factor influencing foreign policy formulation in Japan is globalization, which has encouraged a new generation of “liberals” in Japan. The new liberals mainly consist of young professionals in their twenties and thirties, who admire Western values of freedom and democracy. They support Taiwan’s democracy and strongly condemn human rights violations in mainland China. They do not hesitate to seek open condemnation of repressive regimes rather than quiet diplomacy. Additionally, the Japanese public craves enhanced transparency and accountability in the working of Japanese government. And Japan’s external policy has been going through ever more intense scrutiny in recent years.

⁸ Between 1995 and 1999, Japan provided \$124.73 million in official development assistance to support the Haitian government in the health and medical areas, transportation infrastructure, training of officials, and agriculture. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/00_hakusho/csa/csa_26.html>

⁹ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Message from Foreign Minister Yohei Kono to Fijian President Mara. 26 May 2000. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/5/526.html>>; and Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Situation in the Republic of Fiji. 2 Mar. 2001.

<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/7/0710.html>>

¹⁰ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Emergency Aid to Fiji for its General Elections. 10 July 2001. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/7/0710.html>>

¹¹ In response to Pakistan’s nuclear testing in 1998, Japan froze provision of all new ODA to Pakistan, except for humanitarian aid and grassroot grants. Thus, when the Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, carried out the coup in 1999, Japan did not have any additional ODA to suspend as a measure for economic sanctions.

¹² The diplomatic offensive included Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s visit to Pakistan in August 2000 and the summit meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Musharraf on the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2002.

¹³ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan’s Policy to Lift Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 22 Dec. 2000. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/12/1222.html>>

¹⁴ See, for example, Kohno, Masaharu. Wahei Kousaku (Constructing Peace). Japan: Iwanami Shoten, 1999.

¹⁵ In defense of his action, Hun Sen claimed that Ranariddh was preparing for a military attack against Hun Sen’s



forces by mobilizing the remnants of forces of the Pol Pot faction and by illegally smuggling a number of weapons from former Eastern European countries. See, Imagawa, Yukio. Canbojia to Nihon (Cambodia and Japan) Japan: Rengo Shuppan, 2000. pp. 223-226.

¹⁶ Japan was concerned that Pol Pot faction might have been revitalized with the cooperation of Ranariddh. In fact, Ranariddh admitted having contact with the Pol Pot faction. King Sihanouk also stated that this was not a coup. See, Imagawa, *Ibid.*, pp. 223-226.

¹⁷ Japan's diplomatic offensive included unofficial meetings between Hun Sen and Japanese officials and politicians on the occasion of Hun Sen's visits to Japan and vice versa. Several Japanese parliamentary members, including the former Vice Foreign Minister and the son of a former Japanese foreign minister whom Hun Sen was quite close, also advised him to pursue democracy. Author's interview with a senior MOFA official, August 1997, Hawaii.

¹⁸ Specifically, Japan requested that: 1) Ranariddh stop military cooperation with the Khmer Rouge; 2) the two parties agree on an immediate ceasefire; 3) a trial of Ranariddh should be concluded promptly, to be followed by a pardon; and 4) Ranariddh be allowed to return to Cambodia safely and to participate in a free and fair election as long as he observe the law. See, Imagawa, *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 227.

¹⁹ Speech of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 16 September 2002.

²⁰ On the one hand, some senior MOFA officials were concerned that Aung San Suu Kyi might lack the capability to govern Burma. Also, natural resources in Burma attracted the interest of Japanese trading companies. On the other hand, there was considerable political support in Japan for Aung San Suu Kyi, a 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. In fact, Japanese Diet members formed a Parliamentary League to Support Aung San Suu Kyi. See, for example, Green, Michael J. Japan's Reluctant Realism Palgrave, New York: 2000. pp. 182-183.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

²² Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Myanmar and Cambodia in a New ASEAN: Dilemmas and Opportunities (Japan: RIPS. 2000), p. 1. Also, Japan feared that the continued economic sanctions worsened living conditions for the poor and as such could become a potential source of political instability. See, Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 4.

²³ Burma has geostrategic importance as "an area for Sino-Indian rivalry," in Japan's perspective. See, Nishihara, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 9. Japan viewed China's "aid offensive" in Burma as aimed at gaining naval access to the Indian Ocean. See, "Myanmar ni Mushou Enjo, Chugoku, Keizai Kyouryoku no Oboegaki Chouin (China Signs Aid MOU with Myanmar, Giving United Aid)," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 26 March 1999.

²⁴ RIPS, *op. cit.*, n. 25, p. 29.

²⁵ Japan attempted to resume limited economic aid in 1989 and 1995, respectively, and extended loans for Yangon International Airport facilities in February 1998. Although Aung San Suu Kyi used to oppose any foreign economic assistance to Burma on the grounds that it would benefit the military junta, she finally acknowledged that Burma needs Japan's ODA and requested enhanced transparency in the provision of the assistance. See, "Gaishou to Kaidan no Suchi-san, Nihon no Enjo Houshin ni Rikai (Ms. Suu Kyi Recognized Japan's Aid Policy in Her Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 6 Aug. 2002.

²⁶ Many Japanese leaders have expressed Japan's intention to provide support for democratization and nation-building efforts in Burma. For example, in October 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Burma Chairman Than Shwe held the first summit meeting since 1984, at the ASEAN Plus Three summit meeting in Manila, in which the Japanese Prime Minister took the opportunity to urge Than Shwe to adopt democratization in Burma. Also in December 1998, former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Burma to discuss issues of medicine, education and energy development with the SPDC leaders. See, RIPS, *op. cit.*, n. 25, p. 29. Additionally, in August 2002, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited Burma and met with the SPDC leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi. Kawaguchi urged the two sides to initiate policy-oriented dialogue to discuss humanitarian issues so that eventually the two sides might be able to advance such dialogue into political dialogue to discuss the next phase of governance. See Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 5 Aug. 2002.

<http://www.MOFA.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_kawaguchi/ASEAN+3_02/nm_gh.html>

²⁷ Overall, Japan had a positive assessment of Fujimori's achievements during his tenure, especially his efforts to fight terrorism, illegal drugs, and poverty. Japan was sympathetic to Fujimori because of his Japanese heritage and because of Peru's terrible conditions: annual inflation rate of some 10,000%; huge government deficits that almost destroyed the national financial system; and frequent incidents of terrorism. Japan provided \$66.14 million in 1995 and \$80.14 million in 1998 as ODA and helped Peru build social infrastructure including schools and hospitals.

²⁸ Author's interview with a senior MOFA official, 13 September 2002, Washington, D.C. Fujimori's "return to



democracy” was subsequently criticized by the OAS and the United States because the Peruvian National Intelligence Service still engaged in repressive authoritarian practices.

²⁹ For the elections in 2000 and 2001, Japan dispatched electoral observation missions and provided \$200,000 to the OAS to support its electoral monitoring effort. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dispatch of Electoral Observation Mission for the Presidential and Other Elections in the Republic of Peru. 23 March 2000 and 28 March 2001. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/3/323.html>>; and <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/3/0328-3.html>>

³⁰ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Official Development Assistance. (<http://www.MOFA.go.jp/policy/oda/category/democratiz/1999/partner.html>)

³¹ Especially in recent years, criticism of Japan’s ODA policy toward China has intensified primarily because of Japan’s increasing concern that its economic assistance might abet China’s military modernization while virtually almost no one in China appreciated Japanese economic aid. See, for example, Komori, Yoshihisa Pekin Houdou 700 Nichi (700 Days in Beijing as a Correspondent) Japan: PHP Shuppan, 2000.

³² Examples of Japan’s support under the PDD initiative include: support for Vietnam’s establishment of a legal system; arranging Democratization Study Seminars for senior government officials from developing countries since 1992; providing training assistance at the UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders for officials engaged in crime prevention and criminal justice mainly in Asia-Pacific region; support for the UN Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance in the field of human rights; support for training election observers and for community leaders in Zambia in preparation for the 1998 local elections; sponsoring a symposium on human rights in the Asia-Pacific region; providing support for governance improvements in African countries; and contributions to UN programs to benefit women. Additionally, Japan has supported democratic elections in about 40 countries around the world by dispatching personnel, providing financial assistance and electoral training, as well as supplying equipment and materials. See, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Partnership for Democratic Development <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pdd/index.html>>

³³ In 2002, the cumulative amount of Japan’s ODA for China reached approximately \$24 billion, a more than 50% share of the entire bilateral economic aid that China has received from all countries. Other objectives of Japan’s ODA to China include: 1) providing Japan’s wartime compensation to China; and 2) deepening economic interdependence.

³⁴ Even in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, when the West enforced economic sanctions against China, Japan emphasized the importance of promoting China’s stable economic growth, instead of isolating Beijing. After suspending economic aid for a brief period of time, Japan was the first country to resume economic aid to China, and urged the West to lift economic sanctions as well.

³⁵ Especially given China’s ongoing efforts to modernize its military, an increasing number of Japanese came to believe economic aid may have assisted Chinese military modernization and that Japan might have been too conciliatory in dealing with Beijing.

³⁶ With regard to humanitarian issues, Japan has been primarily concerned with the abducted Japanese citizens as well as the return of Japanese wives who has been living in North Korea. Also, the issue of international cooperation in response to an increasing number of North Korean refugees seeking political asylum abroad, especially in China, has become an important agenda item for the MOFA.

³⁷ Reportedly, in the event of diplomatic normalization between the two countries, Japan’s provision of economic aid to North Korea is expected to become somewhere around \$10 billion. See “Japan Expected to Aid N. Korea: Communists Seek \$10 Billion in World War II Reparations,” *Washington Post*, 14 September 2002.

³⁸ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. 17 Sep. 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html>

³⁹ Privately, the Japanese oil industry and the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry sought in vain to ease economic sanctions.

⁴⁰ For example, see, Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Guilty Sentences for Four Dissident Human-Rights Activists in Cuba.” 17 March 1999 <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/1999/3/317.html>>; and Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Parole of Anti-Government Human Rights Activists in Cuba. 19 May 2000 <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2000/5/519.html>>.

⁴¹ Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Visit to Japan of Mr. Felipe Ramon Perez Roque Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba. 7 March 2001.



<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/cuba/fmv0103/outline.html>>.