

**THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF  
DEMOCRACY:**

**Final Report of the Community of Democracies' Conference  
Washington, DC February 20-21, 2001**

*Sponsored by the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies  
and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States*

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**When preparing this report, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy relied on information and citations collected from various persons and institutions and therefore cannot guarantee the exact accuracy of all quotes in the report.**

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fall of the Berlin wall marked the beginning of a new, third wave of democratic transitions around the globe. But unlike any previous wave, the current era has been marked by an equally profound trend: the decision by governments to use the regional and multilateral organizations to which they belong as tools to support and deepen democracy. These organizations are challenging and reshaping the age-old principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty to combat what has been termed its unacceptable corollary: the “principle of indifference.” Far from indifference, states have given many of these organizations a mandate to collectively defend and support democracy. This includes: direct assistance to build democratic institutions and systems; collective action and sanctions in the event of the interruption of a democratic government; information; and best practices in the “how to’s” of democracy building.

High-level representatives from 16 regional and multilateral organizations from the around the world, government officials, and experts from academia and civil society met at the Organization of American States for two days to discuss the role of regional organizations in promoting and defending democracy. The meeting was sponsored by the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, a coalition of 110 governments committed to democracy and strengthening democratic institutions. The Members of the Convening Group are: Chile, the Czech Republic, India, Mali, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and the United States. On behalf of the Convening Group, Chile and the United States requested that the Secretary General of the OAS host a meeting in Washington. The OAS General Secretariat’s Unit for the Promotion of Democracy organized and facilitated this conference.

The idea of bringing together the principal international organizations supporting democracy was proposed at the first Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw, Poland in June 2000. At the Warsaw meeting, governments endorsed the Warsaw Declaration, committing themselves to a core set of democratic principles and practices and to support one another in meeting democratic objectives. The Washington meeting summarized in this document is a direct result of the Warsaw commitments. It represents the first meeting of its kind – the coming together of the principal regional and multinational organizations supporting democracy around the globe to share experiences and advance an agenda of international cooperation and collaboration. It reflects the commitment of the member states of these organizations to further advance democratic development worldwide.

## **Convergence and Agreement Among Regional and Multinational Organizations**

The conference found significant convergence among the diverse trends in democratic development in Asia, Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and Europe. This convergence amidst diversity reflects increasingly shared values, common tools and policies. Based on mandates from the member states, nearly every regional and multinational political institution is now actively engaged in directly supporting or promoting democracy in their member states. The actions of these organizations are continuing to expand in scope and number, opening up new opportunities --- and greater need -- for collaboration.

The leaders of the participating regional and multinational organizations noted the remarkable similarity in the challenges they faced. OAS Secretary César Gaviria maintained that many of the threats to democracy in the 21st Century are global, not only regional: threats of international crime and drug trafficking, corruption, and the disillusionment with democracy without significant social and economic progress. Remarkable as well was the growing consensus among these institutions that a broader definition of democracy – consistent with the Warsaw principles and including elements such as respect for human rights, free elections, independent judiciaries, transparent and accountable institutions, civilian control of the military, and poverty reduction – is the only likely way of institutionalizing democracy and preventing its reversal.

This report reflects the major findings, debates and accords of the Washington conference. The conference achieved widespread agreement in key areas about the common challenges facing regional organizations and developed a series of action-oriented recommendations to further deepen inter-institutional cooperation. The recommendations are briefly summarized below and are elaborated in greater detail in the final section of the report.

### **Key Recommendations: An Action Agenda for Regional and Multilateral Organizations**

The principal recommendations of the conference form an “action agenda” of next steps to advance inter-institutional cooperation and expand support for democracy around the globe. These recommendations are briefly summarized in three categories:

## 1. Action Agenda for New and Strengthened Instruments to Support Democracy

An important proposal was brought by the Peruvian Justice Minister Diego García-Sayán to develop a **new Inter-American Charter for Democracy**. The intention of the new Charter would be to advance and make more systematic and concrete the “rules of the game” of the hemispheric community in the defense of democracy. Ambassador Javier Pérez de Cuellar, former UN Secretary General and Chancellor of Perú, submitted this initiative to the OAS, with its further discussion to be advanced at the upcoming Québec Summit of the Americas.

Along with the Charter proposal, participants discussed widely a range of proposals to develop new instruments to support democracy or strengthen and better coordinate the instruments currently in use, including:

- ❑ Create a **cadre of trained** mediators or facilitators able to assist countries under threat of an interruption of democracy;
- ❑ Develop **early warning systems** to detect countries nearing a democratic crisis so that early intervention and assistance can be provided;
- ❑ Develop a **comprehensive index of democracy criteria** to reflect a broader concept of democracy in keeping with the principles contained in the Warsaw declaration;
- ❑ Create **joint protocols on election monitoring** so that organizations mutually recognize and agree on the minimum requirements necessary for fair electoral monitoring; and,
- ❑ **Broaden existing instruments** to apply to cases of deterioration of democracy.

## 2. Action Agenda to Increase Outreach and Develop New Areas of Assistance

In providing democracy assistance, the participating organizations agreed on the need to reach out to diverse actors and employ new methodologies, including:

- ❑ Work more extensively with civil society organizations;
- ❑ Utilize new technologies in the advancement of democracy;
- ❑ Hire more local, rather than international personnel to implement programs to help build local capacity; and,
- ❑ Increase cooperation and complementarity of democracy-support programs with development assistance, including through coordination with multilateral donor and lending institutions.

Also agreed upon was the need to develop new forms of democracy assistance to meet emerging challenges in member countries, including assistance in the fields of:

- Democratic Culture;
- Minority Rights and Programs to Reduce Ethnic Conflict; and,
- Political Participation and Party Development

### **3. Action Agenda to Expand Inter-Institutional Cooperation**

The most significant agreements were to advance cooperation among regional and multinational organizations. A set of specific actions were discussed, including to:

- Hold a **stage two conference** in late 2001/early 2002 to follow up on the specific agreements and issues emerging from the Washington conference. The Government of Romania, which serves as the current chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), offered to have the OSCE host this next conference.
- Create a practical, **electronic network for democracy** among the participating organizations. This proposal was made by Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator of OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). Far from a static source of public information, she explained that this network would provide organizations with access to best practice experiences in democracy promotion, lessons on the "how to's" of specific types of democracy assistance, and offer a debating facility an information exchange among organizations.
- Provide **technical assistance** to strengthen democracy support within regional and multinational organizations. These include: technical assistance to set up democracy promotion units in organizations that do not have such institutions and consultations/best practice information-sharing to strengthen the technical capacity of organizations.
- **Better coordinate and harmonize existing instruments** to respond to threats to democratic stability and governance, including:
  - Mutually recognize and support the actions taken by other multilateral and regional organizations through some form of "trigger" or rapid consideration mechanism; and,

- Recognize and enforce national-level measures adopted by multinational organizations and their national governments.

## **The Final Report**

Each of the recommendations, agreements, and discussions are described in greater detail in this final report. Section II provides the opening findings of the conference and describes the activities of each of the participating organizations. Section III summarizes the discussion and debates concerning three key components in promoting and defending democracy: (i) strengthening of democratic values, institutions, and culture; (ii) development and application of political and juridical instruments in defense of democracy; and, (iii) actions to prevent an interruption of democracy. Finally, Section IV summarizes the agreements and prospective future actions by the participating organizations. The conference's agenda and list of participants are provided as annexes. Annex III provides the text of the final communiqué of the Community of Democracies.

The conference was viewed by those involved as an important step in fostering greater collaboration and deeper ties between regional and multilateral organizations in the field of democracy. In this effort, the building of an integrated and activist Community of Democracies has the potential to set the twenty-first century apart from all its predecessors.

## **II. EXPANSION AND CONVERGENCE: THE GROWING ROLE OF REGIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEFENSE AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY**

The trends are striking: almost all regional and multinational organizations now undertake specific actions to promote and defend democracy, noted Ambassador Alberto Van Klaveren, Director of Planning for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. For all of these organizations, Van Klaveren stressed, the importance of their democracy support activities has grown. The organizations involved include not only a wide range of multinational political organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU), but also organizations that have a more focused mission such as economic development (e.g. United Nations Development Program (UNDP)) or trade (e.g. MERCOSUR). Two associated trends became clear in the conference. First, expansion -- in terms of number of organizations involved and size of their operations -- and convergence -- similarity of thinking in terms of the types of actions, activities, and objectives pursued by these organizations. Documenting and comparing the key trends of regional and multinational organizations in the defense and promotion of democracy was a key focus of the conference. Its results are presented below, organized by the two principal and interrelated trends of expansion and convergence.

### **A. The Roots of Expansion**

To many at the conference, the roots of the expansion of regional and multinational organizations into the vocation of supporting democracy come from the greater worldwide acceptance of democracy as the only viable political system for guaranteeing citizens' rights. Ambassador Joel W. Adechi of Benin argued that: "The emergence of democracy as a universally accepted form of government is one of the most important developments of our century." The expansion of activity to support democracy was possible because of a "convergence in thinking among key regions of the world," commented OAS Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Luigi Einaudi. Juan Gabriel Valdés, Permanent Representative of Chile to the UN and former Minister of Foreign Relations, indicated that it is not only that democracy has expanded around the globe, but that it has become a part of our fundamental principles and values, part "of a new common sentiment of how to live in society." It was neither a short, nor simple process to arrive at this level of acceptance of democracy noted Ambassador Esteban Tomic Errázuriz, Chilean Ambassador to the OAS. Ambassador Tomic evoked the long historical process of democratic development that stretched back to the French Revolution.

Regional and multinational organizations responded to this increasing embrace of democracy worldwide at the behest of their member governments. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, a keynote speaker at the conference, suggested that this was a logical transformation: “To be relevant, [regional and multinational organizations] must become instruments of action. To keep pace, they must constantly adapt. To be effective, they must be champions of democracy.”

In that regard, Diego García Sayán, the Peruvian Justice Minister, announced an important and substantive proposal at the conference to adopt an Inter-American Democracy Charter. He indicated that “it is indispensable that we advance in the systematization of the different principles, norms, procedures, mechanisms and methodologies that over the years have been approved by the OAS for the defense and promotion of democracy.” He explained that Peru has had a difficult and uneven transition to democracy in which international actions such as electoral observation and diplomacy played roles at different points in time. The Peruvian experience, he argued, provided an important context for understanding the importance and value of advancing to more systematic instruments that applied to the deterioration of democracy without the most explicit action of a *coup d’etat*. García-Sayán argued that a new Inter-American Democracy Charter would be able to provide more precise “rules of the game” in the defense of democracy and give the current multilateral system greater coherency and consistency. García-Sayán announced that Ambassador Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Peruvian Foreign Minister, had submitted the initiative to the OAS, which they hoped would further be elaborated and developed in the upcoming Québec Summit of the Americas and subsequent regional meetings of the Community of Democracies.

**Expansion with regional differences.** This expansion into policies and actions to support democracy, however, was not a uniform one among regional and multinational organizations. Participants discussed openly the different pace of change within their organizations and the different challenges they faced. Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s former foreign minister and leader in advocating a more active Southeast Asian region in support of democracy, acknowledged the differences between ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] and other regional organizations in this regard. He stressed that in contrast to other regions, ASEAN members “have different structures, values, and systems...there are no standards in ASEAN... it was not founded for any political ideology... it is an organization strung together despite its differences.” Nonetheless, Surin and M.C. Abad Jr, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, both noted how the organization and its members were facing new challenges to their long-held prohibition against interference in the internal affairs of member states and the traditional silence about democracy in the region. Both cited the 1997-8 financial crisis as a turning point for Southeast Asia. In Surin’s words, the

region had “lost its appeal” in the international arena. Abad reflected that the crisis “had shown how rapid financial and economic liberalization unaccompanied by good governance could disrupt economies and threaten socio-political stability.” The region was further rocked by the violence in East Timor. Surin noted that ASEAN was not yet engaging in measures such as election monitoring and collective intervention to prevent an overthrow of democracy increasingly found in other regional organizations. Nonetheless, he argued, democracy overall was now a “weight on ASEAN as a whole” and was openly mentioned at a recent Brunei meeting of the organization.

Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Palous noted differences between Eastern Europe and other regions and countries. For Eastern Europe and the Czech Republic, in particular, the building of democracy is more “challenging” in comparison to a country such as the United States. The Czech Republic started with no historical basis for democracy, no long-term experience to draw on. The United States had more continuity and experience with democracy since it happened over a long period of time.

***The evolution of the principle of non-intervention.*** For many participants, one of the most marked changes within these organizations was the new flexibility found in the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state. Diego Abente Brun, Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS and chair of the OAS Working Group on Representative Democracy recalled the words spoken by Argentine Foreign Minister Rodriguez Giavirini at the OAS’s Windsor, Canada year 2000 General Assembly: “The principle of non-interference must always be accompanied by the principle of non-indifference.” Western Hemisphere participants, in particular, noted a major evolution in the principle of non-intervention in their region. Juan Gabriel Valdés, Permanent Representative of Chile before the United Nations, stressed that in the Western Hemisphere it is important to distinguish between unilateral intervention and “collective and multilateral action in favor of democracy.” Valdés noted the gradual transformation of the principle of non-intervention in the region because of its use on a multilateral, not unilateral basis as it was during the Cold War. Valdés further stressed that this transformation was facilitated as well by changes in international relations. “The immense majority of countries in the region are concerned, each time more so, with the international legitimacy of their political regimes and the valuation and recognition of the important role that international cooperation is beginning to play in this field.” To ASEAN members, the primacy of the principle of non-intervention still provides a stumbling block to collective action to threats against democracy in the region, even when undemocratic rule in one nation threatens the peace and economic stability of the region as a whole.

### **Taking into Account the Complexity of Democratic Development.**

While expansion of the role of multilateral organizations in support of democracy was duly noted, OAS General Secretary César Gaviria and others cautioned that this must be tempered by the recognition of the complexity of the task of promoting democracy and the need to explore more fully how democracy interrelates with economic and social development. Gaviria laid out a more elaborate picture of the “close relationship between political and economic questions” as well as concern about the capacity of many democracies to adequately confront social problems. He argued that in Latin America, democracy has advanced despite the entrenchment of poverty and “belts of misery.” This, he argued, has caused many Latin Americans to perceive “democracy in trouble.”

## **B. Convergence Towards Shared Aims**

Despite substantial regional differences and the complex nature of advancing democracy, regional and multinational organizations have converged in undertaking similar actions and using compatible instruments to support the aim of strengthening democracy.

**Common Programs.** A core group of programs and activities to strengthen democracy are practiced by the vast majority of organizations represented at the meeting. These include:

- Civic education and democratic culture strengthening
- Election monitoring
- Support to civil society
- Judicial reform and strengthening
- Human rights monitoring and advocacy
- Support to parliaments
- Election reform and monitoring of pre-electoral conditions to improve the fairness of elections.
- Decentralization and local government strengthening.
- Political participation and party strengthening.

Despite the convergence in terms of activities, participants noted that the practice was not fully uniform. To cite one example, former Foreign Minister of Thailand Surin admitted that election monitoring and other such actions in support of democracy could be summed up as: “not in my region.”

While convergence on key pro-democracy actions reflects the developing consensus among regional and multinational organizations regarding support for

democracy, participants noted it raises, in some cases, questions of inefficiencies. Clearly, organizations are beginning to develop areas of particular expertise or comparative advantage. Jan Kubis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example, stressed that OSCE has a particular tradition and specialization in human rights monitoring. Jos Lemmers of the Council of Europe raised the importance of developing a grid or map of each of the organizations and their principal areas of activity to both facilitate greater inter-institutional cooperation and to begin to promote specialization among organizations to avoid duplication of efforts. This suggestion was incorporated into the final recommendations of the conference.

***Convergence in instruments to defend democracy.*** Remarkable as well were the advances in many organizations in establishing instruments to respond collectively if democracy was interrupted or conversely to require democracy as a condition for memberships. These instruments have resulted from vastly different histories and have taken different forms. Speaker after speaker remarked on the very individual route of each organization to establish such mechanisms and apply them. Examples include:

- *The Commonwealth of Nations.* Jon Sheppard, Political Affairs Director for the Commonwealth of Nations discussed the 1991 Hararé “landmark agreement” linking for the first time full participation and benefits in the Commonwealth to willingness to adhere to democratic ideals. This agreement was further strengthened in the 1995 Millbrook Action Programme, which lays out the steps to be taken to bring about the restoration of democracy within a reasonable timeframe in the event of an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government in a member country.
- *MERCOSUR.* MERCOSUR, the customs union created among the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay provides an interesting case of an economic-based union that now requires democracy as a condition for membership and trade benefits. Ambassador Leila Rachid de Cowles of the Paraguayan Embassy in the United States stressed that the pro-democracy stance of Mercosur evolved from both the “necessity and conviction” that economic and political policies need to be unified as a consequence of greater interdependence. Sanctions of the organization against an interruption of democracy can only be lifted after agreement of all members that there has been a full re-establishment of democratic order.
- *The Organization for African Unity (OAU).* OAU Deputy Director Dieudonne Kombo-yaya laid out the “extraordinary” change within the Organization stemming first from the 1993 Addis Ababa Commitment to a democratic

Africa to the 1997 “Hararé Spirit” to the 2000 Lomé Declaration. While such commitments were unable to prevent a series of military coups in the region, they represented a new linkage between democracy and membership, participation, and economic benefits in the OAU. The East African island nation of Comoros, for example, was not invited back to participate in the Lomé summit after a *coup d’etat* in April 1999.

- *Organization of American States.* Secretary Gaviria describes the OAS’s Resolution 1080 as “the driving force in defending democracy in the region” as it authorizes consultations and joint actions in the event of an illegitimate interruption of a democratic government in the region. The OAS’s activism in defense of democracy, as well, developed over time and principally only after the Cold war had ended and a greater consensus emerged in the region for a common response to democratic reversal.

Section III provides a fuller description of the debate over instruments employed in the event of an interruption of democracy and includes suggestions by participants for improving and strengthening these instruments so that they are more effectively employed. There was consensus on the need to improve and more consistently apply these regional instruments. The widespread existence of such mechanisms to defend democracy signals a new era in which democratic credentials are becoming more and more indispensable for participation and benefits in multinational organizations.

### **C. Democracy Support by the Participating Regional and Multinational Organizations**

An important objective of the OAS-sponsored Washington conference was to provide a forum for the key regional and multinational organizations to exchange information and share common experiences and lessons learned in the support and promotion of democracy. Following is a brief summary of the key attributes of over 20 regional and multinational organizations active in this field.

#### ***Western Hemisphere Organizations***

*Andean Community.*<sup>1</sup> Sebastian Alegrett, Secretary General of the Andean Community, argued that the Andean countries were in a critical moment in their democratic development. The Community has developed a series of sanctions and actions to be taken in the event of a democratic interruption within the region, including suspension from the Andean trade agreement and from access to membership loans and other regional benefits. Allan Wagner, Advisor to the

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<sup>1</sup> Perú, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador.

Secretary General, indicated that the Andean Community's more recent actions have stressed the deepening of a democratic culture and firmer commitments to the defense of human, social, indigenous and cultural rights.

*Caribbean Community.* CARICOM represents the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean but has begun to expand contacts as well with Caribbean countries of other languages and cultures. Democracy is a requirement for membership in CARICOM and the institution has initiated actions in a range of democracy-related fields. The organization had had no experience with electoral observation until recent observations in Guyana, Suriname and Haiti, explained Assistant Secretary General Albert Ramdin. Ramdin outlined the new threats to democracy in the region stemming from changes in the global economic and political environment. He cited, for example, threats to the banana industry in the Caribbean, new restrictions and supervision of the financial services industry and the proliferation of cross-border activities such as illegal arms trafficking, drug trade, and contraband.

*Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).* As the largest development institution and lender supporting Latin America and the Caribbean, the IDB has expanded markedly in recent years in operations, technical assistance, and policy dialogue that support the democratic development of its member countries. In particular, the IDB has promoted reform of the state, civil society development and dialogue, and the links of state performance, or "good governance," to economic and social development.

*Rio Group.*<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Alberto Van Klavaren of Chile described how the Rio Group emerged as an informal consultation mechanism out of the complexity of the 1980s crisis in Latin America (e.g. debt crisis, civil conflicts in Central America). While still not a formal institution, the group has evolved over 15 years to achieve "permanent continuity" in which its members meet at the highest levels of government at least once a year. This provides a permanent consultation mechanism within Latin America and with other regions and countries with special significance to the region. Non-democracies were not allowed initial membership, a fact that kept Chile from joining until the 1990s. Both the Rio Group's central strength and weakness come from its principle of acting on the unanimity of its members. Van Klavaren argued that the group's most substantive advance has been in regional political cooperation and that its key asset is in the ability to respond to Latin America's need for new collective instruments – that operate on a flexible basis -- towards a common foreign policy.

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<sup>2</sup> The eight founding members were: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, México, Panamá, Perú, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

*MERCOSUR.* The MERCOSUR nations of the Southern Cone of Latin America provide an interesting case of an initially trade-based organization that has evolved to take on a greater political role, particularly in the defense and support of democracy in the region. The MERCOSUR nations established a common external tariff in 1995, but as Ambassador Leila Rachid Cowles explained, members increasingly recognized the link of trade and democracy as a result of their increasing trade integration. The most significant democratic commitment of MERCOSUR was signed in Argentina in June 1996, in which members committed to apply joint sanctions against any disruption of democratic institutions. The “full existence” of democratic institutions was made a requirement for participation in MERCOSUR. In 2000, sanctions were applied “within hours,” of an attempted military coup in Paraguay.

*Organization of American States.* The OAS is one of the world’s oldest regional organizations and is dedicated to the political, social and economic advancement of the Western Hemisphere. The promotion and defense of democracy is a key objective enshrined in the Organization’s Charter, and the OAS member states act collectively to respond to specific instances of democratic interruptions in member countries using consultation, support, and sanctions, through mechanisms such as Resolution 1080, adopted in 1991.

The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) of the General Secretariat is an additional instrument created in 1990 to provide assistance to an array of democratic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. In particular, the UPD supports member countries in the areas of: election assistance and monitoring; support to post-conflict societies and conflict resolution; promotion of democratic values; decentralization and local government; and legislative strengthening.

*Parliamentary Commission of MERCOSUR.* The advance of the MERCOSUR nations can be seen in the specific creation of a Parliamentary Commission to support the parliaments of the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Joint Parliamentary Commission was established in 1991 to keep parliaments informed on MERCOSUR and regional developments and better include parliaments in the wider integration process and, increasingly, has been preparing for a more active role to react to crisis and seek the restoration of democratic rule in the region, when required.

### ***European-Based Organizations***

*Council of Europe.* The 51 year old Council of Europe now has 43 members encompassing Western, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, thus approaching its vision to be a truly Pan-European institution. The Council provides a wide range of support to its new member states to assist in the transition to democracy including: promoting human, economic, social, and cultural rights;

administering decentralization and citizen participation programs; and instituting new initiatives on corruption. Jos Lemmers, Executive Director of the North-South Center of the Council, outlined the new challenges to the Council in Europe in the form of minority rights, refugees, racism, and ethnic cleansing. In cases of persistent violations of human rights, sanctions could lead to the expulsion from the Council.

*European Commission.* The European Union (EU), jointly with its European Commission, has been one of the pioneering regional organizations founded on the fundamental principles of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law. Membership from its inception to today is offered only to democratic countries. Justin Davidson, Senior Advisor at the EU, laid out the increasing legal and operational framework that has continued to refine and expand the EU's pro-democracy mission, including requiring human rights clauses in over 50 international agreements. Davidson outlined EU priorities, which included: human rights education, strengthening legal systems, protection of minorities, and abolition of the death penalty.

*International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).* IDEA, based in Sweden, works to "build, support and promote democracy in all regions." It has programs in nations as diverse as Burkina Faso, Kosovo, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Paraguay. Bengt Soderbergh, Executive Director of IDEA, laid out for the conference recommendations to respond to the new challenges to democracy building, moving beyond what he termed as the recent "decade of elections" to a broader field of programs that included political participation, local level participation, and civil society strengthening.

*Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).* The OSCE is a pan-European security organization of 55 participating states. Its origins stretch back to the early 1970s where it served as a multilateral forum for East-West dialogue and negotiation. The 1975 Landmark Helsinki Act established the basic principles governing the behavior of states towards their citizens and each other. Human rights is the organization's largest area of activity and field of comparative advantage, according to Jan Kubis, the OSCE's Secretary General. Mr. Kubis outlined OSCE's work in strengthening the rule of law, gender equality, freedom of religion, as well as parliamentary support, election monitoring and protection of minorities.

### **Key African and Asian Organizations**

*Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).* ASEAN was created to promote economic liberalization and ties between the member-states of Southeast Asia. M.C. Abad Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary General of ASEAN, explained that "economic liberalization is ASEAN's indirect way of promoting

democratization.” Former Thai Foreign Minister Surin argued that ASEAN is in the challenging position of pushing democracy, human rights and security in a region with different structures, values, and systems and where the principle of non-intervention in national internal affairs holds strong. Even initial dialogue and limited open discussion on democracy within ASEAN has been a breakthrough. Evolution is inevitable, argued Abad: “ASEAN must evolve into a political community of like-minded states.”

*Organization of African Unity.* Deputy Director of the OAU, Dieudonne Komboyaya, laid out the advancement of mechanisms within the OAU to support and defend democratic government in the difficult environment of Africa where military forces routinely continue to challenge civilian rule. The 1993 Addis Ababa Declaration provides the foundation of a joint commitment to a democratic African society. The OAU has developed a series of mechanisms over time for consultation and coordination in the event of interruptions of democracy within the region. These agreements, most recently embodied in the Declaration of Lomé in July 2000, provide for a series of sanctions to be invoked in the event of an interruption of constitutional rule including suspension from the OAU, denial of visas to *coup* plotters, commercial restrictions, and restrictions on government contacts. Before any sanctions would be applied, the OAU agreements provide for six months of consultation to enable the national government to restore constitutional rule.

*Southern African Development Community (SADC).* SADC was formed in 1993 and includes fourteen African states. The organization is primarily devoted to economic cooperation also commits its members to the principles of democracy. Violations of democratic conditions can result in sanctions from the organization.

### ***Global and MultiRegional Institutions and Conferences***

*Commonwealth of Nations.* The Commonwealth’s “democratic vocation” is based upon a series of groundbreaking declarations made at the highest political levels in the member countries of the Commonwealth.<sup>3</sup> The 1991 Hararé Principles link membership benefits to willingness to adhere to democratic ideals. The “teeth”, as Jon Sheppard describes it, is the 1995 Millbrook Action Programme, which lays out the steps and consultations the organization will take to bring about a restoration of democracy in a reasonable time period. Sheppard pointed out that the Commonwealth is one of the few organizations to actually expel members on the basis of democracy criteria, as it did with Nigeria and Pakistan. The Commonwealth’s democracy-promotion program supports conflict resolution, election observation, and democratic capacity and institution building.

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<sup>3</sup> The Commonwealth of Nations includes the former colonies of the United Kingdom worldwide. Its secretariat is based in London.

*Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).* Anders Johnson, IPU Secretary General, laid out the historic 1889 origins of the 140 member inter-parliamentary union. Unusual as an organization not of governments, but of parliaments, the IPU has evolved, according to Johnson, from the Cold war period in which democracy was understood “with qualifiers” to an active promotion and support of democracy worldwide. The IPU’s activities span human rights, social justice, and gender equality, providing an important “parliamentary dimension to the work on democracy.”

*International Conference on New or Restored Democracies.* H.E. Ambassador Joel W. Adechi, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Benin to the UN, described the conclusions and agreements of the December 2000 Conference on New or Restored Democracies in Cotonou, Benin. This was the fourth in a series of international conferences with the objective of advancing democratic development and exchange. The Benin conference was supported by the UN, the International Organization of Francophone countries and donor nations.<sup>4</sup> The conference adopted the Cotonou Declaration, which includes commitments to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, democratic and human rights, and the right to development. The event also provided specific recommendations to multinational organizations, national governments, civil society, and the private sector.

*International Organization of Francophone States.* Ambassador Ridha Boahbib of the Association of Francophone States maintained that the sharing of the French language among the Francophone states extended much further to the sharing of common values: “human rights, freedom, and, of course, democracy.” He laid out the Organization’s top priorities in democracy building. First, the strengthening of democratic institutions, which includes support to: an association of francophone mediators, an association of national schools of public administration, national parliaments, constitutional courts, and strengthening of electoral bodies. Its second priority was in the promotion of democratic culture and human rights. The organization has adopted specific actions in the event of a *coup d’etat* in its member states.

*United Nations.* The United Nations and its associated agencies have clear comparative advantages in the promotion and defense of democracy as an organization with worldwide reach, defined enforcement tools, and the broadest membership of any international organization. Ibrahim Gambari, Advisor for Special Assignments in Africa, transmitted the message of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the conference and detailed the wide-ranging role of the United Nations. This role has included responding to the interruptions of democracy,

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<sup>4</sup> These include Norway, Denmark, the United States, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland.

peacekeeping and monitoring, democracy and development assistance, election monitoring and sponsorship of four international conferences. UN efforts, Annan's message affirmed, are "based on a set of principles, that democracy and the rule of law are inseparably connected." Two of the UN's specialized agencies also participated:

*United Nations Development Program (UNDP).* Ken Sherter, UNDP Senior Advisor for Governance, outlined how UNDP had evolved to recognize the importance of democracy in meeting its central objective of poverty reduction, largely in response to requests from UN member states. With an increase in funding, fully 50% of UNDP resources go to democracy-based programs, up from 15% in 1992. UNDP's program includes: legislative strengthening, human rights, electoral support, judicial reform, and decentralization.

*International Labour Organization (ILO).* This Geneva-based UN Agency supports democratization through the promotion of free labor unions, decent working standards and social equality. The landmark 1989 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work pledges its member countries to respect, promote, and realize the principles of freedom of association; right to collective bargaining; abolition of child and forced labor; and, the elimination of employment discrimination.

*World Bank.* The World Bank is the single largest global lender to the developing world with a specific mandate to reduce poverty. Mats Karlsson, Vice-President for External Relations and United Nations Affairs for the World Bank, explained the important linkages between the Bank's development and poverty mandates and democratic development. Karlsson noted the World Bank has a clear mandate regarding the economic and development impact of its projects and has placed particular emphasis on widening participation in development projects and specifically, in initiatives focussing on education (the world's biggest financier of education), empowering the poor, and anti-poverty efforts.

### **III. REFINING AND ADVANCING KEY MECHANISMS OF SUPPORT FOR PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DEMOCRACY**

The conference stimulated more focused discussion and debate on three key components in the development and advancement of international support for democracy. These areas are: (1) promoting and strengthening democratic values, institutions, and culture; (2) developing and applying political and juridical instruments to defend democracy; and (3) preventing the interruption of democracy. These areas were the subject of specific working group sessions in which practitioners, policymakers, and civil society organizations shared ideas and experiences. The summaries below reflect points raised not only in the working group discussions but also in discussions and presentations in the larger plenary sessions. The recommendations are also reflected in the final section (IV) of this report.

#### **A. Democratic Values, Institutions, and Culture**

Foreign Minister Palous of the Czech Republic, in his remarks to the conference plenary, laid out a vision of democracy developing in three concentric circles. He suggested that an inner circle constituted the building of democracy at home, cultivating a state of mind and attachment to democracy. The second circle was one of “like-minded states” which doesn’t mean, he argued, a melting pot but states that have something in common, such as regional proximity and shared histories. The third circle was democracy on a transnational, universal basis, building the vision of a democratic civilization. He argued that the change in the Czech Republic in the inner circle was much stronger than expected but realistically “might need a change of generations” for a democratic culture to be consolidated.

##### ***Fundamental Role of Values, Culture, and Democratic Institutions.***

Participants had lively discussions about the development of values, democratic institutions, and culture that would enable democracy to become rooted and prosper in all three circles. “Democracy, above all, is a culture,” explained Luis Lauredo, U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, identifying the elements of freedom, rule of law, individual rights, tolerance, and respect for others. The discussion focused on building democratic values within nations in transition and reinforcing and supporting those values through regional and multinational institutions. Jon Sheppard of the Commonwealth of Nations stated clearly that the greatest safeguard against democratic reversal is the development of a democratic culture. Ambassador Ridha Bouabib of the Organization of Francophone States stressed that the promotion of democratic culture and human rights was particularly important in countries with long histories of one-party states.

Despite the emerging consensus on the fundamental role of developing democratic values, culture, and institutions in emerging democratic nations, there was a clear knowledge gap in how to best do this. Ruben Perina of the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy suggested that their search for relevant curriculums and tools in the Latin American region turned up very limited precedents. Jos Lemmers of the Council of Europe offered the advances that the Council had made in establishing a program called Education for Democratic Citizenship in use in all 34 European nations. This curriculum goes beyond national experiences and includes democracy for European citizens and global citizens (e.g. the three circles) and covers human rights, environmental education, peace and conflict resolution, and education for intercultural understanding. The European experience was discussed as a potential best practice case. Civic education was clearly agreed to be the principal input in developing democratic cultures and values over the long-term. An associated way to foster national democratic culture that was suggested was to use more local personnel in executing democracy programs. The working group also discussed the critical role of civil society in the development and consolidation of democratic values and culture.

If democratic values and culture are poorly instilled, this will affect the quality and stability of democratic institutions. There was much concern about the need for greater attention to be paid to good governance and sound public administration. Each feeds the other: the lack of viable democratic institutions undermines citizens' commitments to democratic culture and values, which in turn further undermines democratic institutions. Participants made the link that developing and consolidating democratic culture, values and institutions will require the use of a broader definition of democracy that is more relevant to the average citizen.

***Consensus on Need for Broader Definition of Democracy.*** Nearly all participants referenced the need to consider and understand democracy in its links to social progress, poverty reduction, racial and gender equality, economic policy, and good governance. Ambassador Diego Abente Brun asked: "What is the viability of democracy without economic growth? How does one sustain a democratic system if the cancer of corruption delegitimizes it?" Allan Wagner, Advisor to the Andean Community, explained how this broader understanding of what constitutes democracy and what is needed to make democracy viable was increasingly reflected in the activities of the Andean Community as they expanded to issues of minority and indigenous rights, equity in education, and anti-poverty actions.

As much as participants agreed that this expanded understanding of democracy was important to insure the viability of democratic institutions and

culture, it was less clear how this should be translated into the activities and policies of regional and multinational organizations. Gerald Hyman of USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance raised the concern that too broad a definition of democracy runs the risk of losing the very core and effectiveness of democracy support activities. Moreover, democracy may not always be defined in the same way by all countries and organizations. Lemmers of the Council of Europe maintained that there was "no precise definition of democracy but there was consensus on the core issues that make up democracy." What was clear is that attention simply to the procedural and institutional framework of democracy was insufficient to insure the viability and relevance of democracy in today's more global economy. Mats Karlsson, Vice-President for External and UN Affairs at the World Bank argued that while you cannot make sustainable progress on development without also addressing democracy, he found that the "available research that I have seen, on the linkages between development and democracy is not particularly convincing."

**Strengthening Linkages Between Organizations.** The working group recommended that the linkages of democracy to development, social and human rights, and equality be the subject of more strategic thinking, research, and coordination among regional and multinational organizations. They also discussed a range of ideas to improve the knowledge base among them and develop new instruments to support their collective efforts. Elizabeth Spehar, the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy's Executive Coordinator, explained that the conference was intended to be the first in a series of exchanges among regional and multilateral institutions. She proposed that, in addition to subsequent meetings, inter-institutional collaboration be advanced through the creation of an electronic network among regional organizations. She suggested that this could go beyond linking websites of the participating organizations and be an interactive site for information, best-practices, and direct communication among like-minded institutions. Ms. Spehar offered that the UPD could help launch and sustain the web page. The proposal was widely endorsed and specific organizations offered their assistance in working with the OAS/UPD.

## **B. Political and Juridical Instruments to Defend Democracy**

A range of specific proposals was made to better define, coordinate, expand, and enhance the current political and juridical "tool box" of regional and multilateral organizations to respond to and prevent undemocratic rule. Participants discussed the significant advances in political and juridical instruments used by regional and multilateral organizations, but were able to identify important areas for reform and expansion.

***Defining the Interruption of Democracy.*** Jennifer McCoy of the Carter Center and several other members of the working group panel suggested using elections as one “measuring stick” for interpreting whether there was an interruption of democracy in a given country. They proposed some basic conditions of free elections, the absence of which could support a definition of the interruption of democracy. This framework was intended to comport with the principles of the Warsaw Declaration. The conditions for free elections discussed were:

- the absence of physical coercion or intimidation;
- major parties have the opportunity to get their messages to voters;
- a secret vote and honest count; and,
- the existence of a meaningful appeals process.

Drawing on these conditions, the working group enumerated five cases that would constitute the interruption of democracy in an electoral context:

1. Government conducts a fraudulent election.
2. Election is free and fair but winner is not permitted to take office.
3. Election is free and fair, winner takes office, but subsequently is removed by force.
4. Elected government gradually subverts the democratic process.
5. Political and human rights not respected. Free and fair elections are not possible.

At the same time, there was wide agreement in the group as a whole that international instruments must go beyond evaluating elections to other human and political rights criteria to encompass the kinds of threats that democratic rule faces today. In order to truly move towards effective action, the working group argued that criteria must be broadened for regional and multilateral institutions to respond to situations which signal the lead-up to a coup or political crisis and not act only when a rupture of democracy has occurred. It was agreed that there was also a need to more clearly define the “erosion of rights” and establish the actions to be taken.

***Harmonizing and Coordinating Instruments among International Organizations.*** Even before considering expanding existing instruments, participants discussed the imperative need to better harmonize criteria and coordinate the actions taken when democracy is interrupted. Morton Halperin of the Council of Foreign Relations, a former U.S. National Security Council advisor on democracy and human rights and Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, offered the recent example of Pakistan in which the military government was presented with four different resolutions/communiqués on what would constitute a return to democratic rule. Halperin recommended that

regional and multilateral institutions work towards building a more common external approach to interruptions of democratic rule. It would be best to send governments in the midst of a severe political crisis a clear and united international message. Rafael Roncagnolio of the Peruvian NGO “Transparencia” suggested that even the OAS does not necessarily speak with one voice as there could be separate actions from the OAS General Secretariat, the Permanent Council, and the OAS’s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Daniel Zovatto of International IDEA suggested further that regional organizations often had “double standards” with respect to the applications of sanctions, depending on the strength or strategic importance of the country involved. Organizations need to standardize their own internal processes and develop mechanisms to support quickly and effectively the actions of other similar institutions. Anders Johnson of the Inter-Parliamentary Union called, in particular, for closer coordination between the global-based UN and IPU on democracy and human rights.

There is a need for coordination and harmonization of instruments both within regions and across them and to avoid as well any “double standard” if “instruments are not uniformly employed.” Participants affirmed the principle that regional and multilateral organizations should support and enforce actions taken by another in response to a democratic crisis. The case of EU support for the High-level Mission of the Organization of American States in Peru was cited. Morton Halperin suggested that national governments and their respective multinational organizations develop instruments to jointly “trigger” or recognize specific actions or sanctions employed by other regional organizations. Two readily useable sanctions discussed were the denial of visas to *coup d’etat* plotters or perpetrators and the freezing of assets from ill-gotten gains from coups.

Election monitoring was a final area in which harmonization among organizations was proposed. For example, the UN Electoral Assistance Division requires that an invitation to observe elections be received well in advance of Election Day and, if the Division assesses that conditions are not sufficient for free and fair elections, they will not send observers. Various participants stressed the importance of following such protocols jointly. This would ensure that the validity of election monitoring is not undermined by groups agreeing to observe elections that don’t meet minimum standards for fairness.

***Reforming and Expanding Existing Instruments.*** There was a wide-ranging debate on a number of areas in which there could be reform and expansion of current instruments.

(i) *Linkage of instruments to economic benefits/membership.* A number of organizations require members to be democratic (“democracy clauses”) to receive

trade and economic benefits. EU and MERCOSUR are prominent examples of such conditionality. Participants agreed on the importance and usefulness of conditionality in these cases. Tony Freeman of the International Labour Organization (ILO), in particular, encouraged the expansion of this trade-democracy linkage. At the same time, though, it was mentioned that democracy clauses need to take into account the difficulty of excluding countries where cooperation on security and peace is needed. Participants discussed whether exceptions should be granted in larger institutions such as the UN and World Trade Organization (WTO), with conditionality being an important tool for other economic benefits apart from these global forums.

*(ii) Improving political instruments.* Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés stressed the importance of initial diplomatic actions as paving the way for fuller international efforts. Different political actions -- good offices, dialogue, quiet diplomacy, and suspension from participation in political organizations --- need greater improvement and application, it was argued. Elizabeth Spehar added that in addition to reviewing existing political and juridical instruments, in order to ascertain what might be added or improved (people often talk of strengthening or expanding the scope of the OAS Resolution 1080, for example), it was equally important to work on adherence to existing principles and standards and to expand the capacity to act and provide a set of political actions or “tools” at the disposal of regional organizations.

*(iii) Debating the criminalization of an interruption of democracy.* The working group considered, as well, a proposal by Morton Halperin to make the violation of a democratic election by seizing power by force an international crime against humanity (case 3 above). Instruments against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity require many years to negotiate. The point was that “criminalization” of electoral crime could be a decade away, but needed to start now to build the political consensus to criminalize the interruption of democracy. This debate could begin without identifying the specific sanction(s) for such an action now. Participants discussed concerns that making bad elections or erosion of political rights a crime would preclude negotiations and exit strategies with non-democratic regimes. Would criminalization actually provide a deterrence or greater retrenchment? Jennifer McCoy raised the question of whether criminalization raised the bar too high and provided a disincentive to move to a more democratic system. She pointed to the case of Sierra Leone where peacekeepers were ignored. The panel concluded that beginning the process of developing a political consensus around international electoral crimes might arguably proceed on a parallel track. Some felt that such discussions themselves might provide a deterrent.

*(iv) Importance of enforcement.* It was widely agreed that an important strengthening of current instruments would be in the possibilities for their

enforcement. This includes exploring mechanisms of enforcement and making more uniform current enforcement mechanisms across countries. This same point was raised in the third working group.

### C. Prevention of the Interruption of Democracy

A third working group focused more specifically on the issue of the prevention of the interruption of democracy. It looked specifically at three key areas: abrupt interruption vs. longer-term deterioration, early warning systems, and more broadly, the nature of international responses to interruptions.

***Deterioration vs. Interruption.*** An interruption of democracy through a *coup d'état* or electoral fraud often provides a clearer moment in time in which international organizations can coalesce and pressure for reversal. Participants throughout the conference consistently pointed to the need for greater action to halt the deterioration of democracy; this often occurs over a longer period of time with a less defined “breaking point.” Maria del Carmen Oblitas of the Bolivian Mission to the OAS argued that when we think of interruptions of democracy we too often think principally of *coup d'états*. Yet such interruptions can take many forms, including serious electoral manipulation that falls short of blatant fraud. Piotr Ogrodzinski of the Polish Embassy argued that for Eastern Europe the current problem is more one of deterioration than interruption. Laurence Whitehead of Oxford University pointed out that international action during a process of democratic deterioration definitively has an important advantage – it offers a better opportunity for reversal before the internal situation becomes hardened or chaotic. Participants discussed widely whether the deterioration of democracy, particularly deterioration leading to a national crisis, could be effectively detected through an early warning system.

***Early Warning Systems.*** Participants discussed a number of key elements and characteristics of an early warning system (EWS) that would identify countries nearing a democratic crisis but before the full crisis set in. It was widely agreed that the characteristics of early warning systems should include:

- impartial enough to be respected;
- clearly defined;
- provide an open process for dialogue; and,
- have a clear separation between evaluators and mediators, even if in practice, the two tasks must work together.

They discussed the needs and current lessons in the three stages needed for such systems: detection, evaluation/interpretation, and remediation. All agreed that further development and work was needed at all three stages.

(i) *Detection.* Walt Raymond of the Council for a Community of Democracies provided three indicators of the deterioration in democracy in the Ukraine where he sees a national crisis and a threat to regional security emerging. These three indicators were: 1) systematic erosion of the independent press; 2) efforts to exert undue influence over the legislature; 3) one-sided accusations against political leaders of corruption in an effort to squelch opposition parties. Ogrodzinski of the Polish Embassy argued that you cannot impose standards, they must be mutually agreed upon so that when deterioration takes place there is at least some common language and basis for intervention.

Some precipitating events to deterioration of democratic conditions were commonly recognized: severely flawed elections, civil unrest, financial crisis, suspension of the rule of law, military movements, and gross human rights violations. A Peruvian participant pointed out that there were more subtle events that could take place which also indicated a deterioration of the quality of democracy. Peru offers an important example where the rule of law was undermined over time by corruption and covert actions of the government. Ogrodzinski agreed as well that corruption was also an anti-democratic warning sign.

A detection system should build on existing organizations that have developed a track record and credibility in the local region. Ted Piccone of the U.S. State Department pointed out that there already are Western Hemisphere institutions that provide frameworks for analyzing the deterioration of democracy, human rights being just one part of this framework. An effective EWS, he argued, needs to synthesize information from all of the institutional components of the region, incorporating for example in the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLAC), and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).. Laurence Whitehead pointed out that the region also has substantial development of organizations that do reliable, independent monitoring. Americas Watch and Amnesty International for human rights violations and NGOs monitoring the media were mentioned.

(ii) *Interpretation and Evaluation.* Even if an indicator/detection system could be developed, a process of interpretation of an EWS would then be needed. Luis Bitencourt of the Woodrow Wilson Center argued you must be careful in thinking you can create a mathematical model which provides you with clear results. Democracy is not a precise science. Steven Griner of the OAS's Unit for

Democracy stressed the importance of in-country presence to both detect and respond to the deterioration of democracy. In the case of Haiti, Griner pointed out, early warning mechanisms worked because there was substantial presence in the country with the OAS and the UN collecting information. He warned that the same organization should not have both an early warning function and technical assistance tasks to address deterioration. His point reinforced that of Laurence Whitehead who argued for the separation of the evaluation and mediation functions. Luis Bitencourt added that evaluations need to take into account how authorities react to deterioration. Do they try to address human rights violations once they happen or are they the instigator themselves? The policies of the national government are important, he stressed, to assessing whether a true crisis exists and in what form.

There was concern raised that an EWS could go too far in creating different regional standards, creating in effect “double standards,” if there was not some universal framework laid out. Regional strengths and organizations might provide inputs to an international framework for evaluation. Laurence Whitehead suggested that the UN was the only agency with the global coverage for such a task.

(iii) *Remediation*. What actions would be taken once a close-to-crisis state was detected? Participants stressed that this was one of many important issues still unresolved about EW systems. Participants discussed the merits of informal vs. formal mechanisms for reversing deterioration; clearly one method did not fit all country circumstances. All thought it important that procedures and actions should be on a multilateral, not unilateral basis. It was clearly thought that the process of getting “pre-crisis” countries to restore freedoms or reverse actions would require extremely skillful discussions and negotiations with countries, backed up by international muscle. Madeleine Albright suggested in her address that a cadre of trained mediators, who could bring in lessons and skills from other countries in crisis, was needed. Charlotte Roe of the U.S. Mission to the OAS raised the case of Peru and the importance of a cooperative effort in which both international actors and the local opposition participated. The active role of the Peruvian opposition was important for success in the Peruvian case, she pointed out.

***International Reaction to the Interruption of Democracy.*** Conference participants discussed more broadly how international organizations currently respond to interruptions of democracy. These lessons apply to current instruments and would help feed into the development of any EWS. There continues to be questions of how to apply international sanctions and benefits consistently and effectively. Jon Sheppard of the Commonwealth Secretariat raised the point of the important limitations and inherent contradictions in the role of international organizations. You can’t always intervene directly if the

government is reluctant; it is the worst offenders that will resist most strongly international pressure, Sheppard argued. For many international initiatives, for example, in-country remediation and technical assistance, dialogue, and election monitoring a formal invitation by the host government is required. International organizations often are present in the middle or “grey area” cases because these are the countries that at least invite multilateral organizations in. Countries such as Afghanistan have long eschewed international pressure. Chilean Ambassador Alberto Van Klaveren reminded all that regional and multinational organizations sometimes find themselves in situations where the political call is not easy, torn between “the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility.” He pointed out the limitations of OAS reaction to Peru’s internal crisis. Van Klaveren stressed that “we cannot replace actions that must take place within countries.”

The core of any restoration of democracy lay in national actors. Amr Aljowaly of the Egyptian Mission stressed the importance of the Lomé Declaration to the OAU, which gives a country six months to address its problems internally before regional sanctions/pressure is applied. Developing a global culture in which international interventions are increasingly accepted by all, or better yet, less needed, is a slow process of developing a stronger base for democracy within countries and advancing democracy as a common base for relations between nations. Luis Bitencourt of the Wilson Center, for example, raised the interesting case of Tajikistan where it “wasn’t hard to identify wrongdoings [fraudulent elections], it was hard to make people realize that the wrongdoings are indeed wrong.” This “chicken and egg” dilemma continued to reinforce the need for the longer-term, non-crisis work of regional and multinational organizations in supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions and culture.

## IV. PRINCIPAL AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The spirit of consultation, cooperation and dialogue born at the Community of Democracies conference in Warsaw in June 2000 provided the momentum for a more defined set of objectives among more than 16 regional and multinational organizations meeting in Washington in February of 2001. The Washington conference produced an important “*lluvia de ideas*” -- or rainfall of ideas – as OAS Assistant Secretary General Luigi Einaudi concluded along with specific commitments to share technical assistance, build mechanisms for coordination, and work together in new areas.

This section summarizes the principal agreements and findings that together form a starting point for inter-institutional cooperation. The elaboration and consideration of these ideas is summarized in the preceding three sections.

### **Agreements on the Current Role and Challenges of Multinational and Regional Organizations**

The OAS-sponsored conference was able to identify the increasing complementarity of democracy support activities carried out by regional and multinational organizations, and strikingly, the increasing convergence of thinking regarding the emerging threats to democracy which affect all regions. As UPD Executive Coordinator Elizabeth Spehar noted in her concluding remarks, “democracy has become not only a universal goal, but an increasingly shared value for regional organizations and the countries they represent.”

***Convergence on Key Activities and Instruments.*** The participating organizations noted the increasing scope and scale of their democracy support activities and their shared goals. The work of the majority of these institutions includes: election monitoring, civic education, strengthening of parliaments, ensuring civilian control over the military, human rights, and judicial reform.

Regional and multinational institutions clearly play a more active role during political crises when democratic order is threatened or overturned. Key representatives of these organizations discussed the specific legal instruments developed to respond to such crises, including sanctions against members who violate democratic norms and support provided to restore democratic government. It was agreed that greater attention needed to be placed on addressing the longer-term deterioration of democracy in key countries and in enforcing and applying existing instruments more consistently. Proposals were made to improve the coordination and harmonization of these instruments so

that a more united and consistent international stance is taken to prevent or react to the interruption of democracy. “The progress of democracy needs democratic solidarity,” remarked H.E. Ambassador Joel W. Adechi of Benin. Moving to a more coordinated international response will be particularly important to aid the advancement of democracy in regions where democracy is less deeply-rooted. The discussions at the conference made clear that there is a recognition that actions in support of democracy by regional organizations must be strengthened and complemented by other actors, particularly by organized civil society, both from within a country struggling with democracy as well as through worldwide solidarity.

**Emerging Challenges to 21st Century Democracy.** There was also clear agreement that despite regional differences, emerging democratic governments are increasingly facing similar threats. Nations around the globe are facing pressure from a new series of globalized threats – e.g. drug trafficking; international crime and corruption; and, ethnic tensions and war – threats that cannot be met without strong democratic governments. Peruvian Justice Minister Diego Garcia-Sayán described what transpired in Peru: “the breakdown of democracy allowed criminal organizations to grow and take over Peru.” He proposed in his remarks the establishment of a new “democracy charter” for the OAS. U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Luis Lauredo, among others, stressed that current challenges are coming more from the deterioration of governments that were elected democratically: “Elected, but authoritarian leaders, with popular, but undemocratic practices are a threat in this hemisphere and in other parts of the world.”

Democracy is endangered as well by “the limited capacity to confront social problems,” explained OAS Secretary General César Gaviria. Nearly all participants referenced the need to understand democracy in its links to social progress, poverty reduction, racial and gender equality, economic policy, and good governance. An expanded definition of what constitutes a working and viable democracy – one that is able to address poverty, social, gender and ethnic needs – was one commonly agreed to as the only realistic route to ensure the sustainability of democracy over time. The words of a Malawi delegate to the Warsaw conference were recalled: “free institutions have little chance to survive if they are not associated with a better quality of life.”

**Conference participants made a number of observations regarding the globalization of threats to democracy and the linkage of democratic progress to economic and social policy, including:**

- It increases the value of and need for greater cooperation and coordination among regional and multinational organizations, particularly between

political and development-oriented institutions such as the World Bank, IDB, and Asian Development Bank.

- It requires greater research and analysis on how best to structure and focus democratic development programs to support an expanded understanding of what constitutes a viable democracy.

### **Action Agenda: Key Conference Recommendations**

#### **1. ACTION AGENDA FOR ENHANCED INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION**

Participants agreed on a series of steps to create the framework for more sustained cooperation, collaboration, and sharing of lessons learned. Specifically, the recommended actions included:

- **Hold Stage Two Conference.** One of the most important agreements is that this initial framework of cooperation, consultation, and study as outlined in this section would be further advanced in a second stage conference hosted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) under the initiative of the Government of Romania, which serves as the current chair of the OSCE. Recommendations would be followed up on, consolidated, and reviewed at the upcoming meeting. Young-jin Choi, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director of Policy Planning for the Republic of Korea outlined as well the contribution to be made in the action agenda of the Community of Democracies by the Fall 2002 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Community of Democracies in Seoul. This meeting will include a forum for civil society as well.
- **Create an Electronic Network for Democracy.** A parallel, sustained form of inter-institutional cooperation was proposed by the Organization of American States' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy and strongly agreed to by participants. The proposal advanced by Elizabeth Spehar, UPD Executive Coordinator, was to create an electronic network among the participating organizations. This would be an active practitioners' network, not a static source of public information. It would provide for access to best practice experiences, lessons on "how to's" of specific types of democracy assistance, information on collective activities as well as a page

of links to each organizations' web page. It would contain a private debating facility to link organizations in discussions on key democracy topics. Jos Lemmers suggested and offered the participation of the Council of Europe in a working group of organizations that will assist the OAS in the development of this electronic facility.

- **Improve Coordination and Harmonization of Instruments Applied When Democracy is Threatened.** When democracy is in severe crisis or overturned, regional and multinational organizations might invoke sanctions or actions to seek to reverse the coup or address the political deterioration. The effectiveness of these actions could be enhanced if greater efforts were made to coordinate and harmonize existing sanctions invoked by international organizations. Specific mechanisms could include:
  - Mutually recognize and support the actions taken by other multilateral and regional organizations through some form of **“trigger” or rapid consideration mechanisms**; and,
  - **Recognize and enforce national-level sanctions** adopted by multinational organizations and their national governments, such as the exclusion of international visas for coup plotters or perpetrators; and the freezing of national assets of those convicted of benefitting from ill-gotten gains from coups.
  
- **Technical Assistance between Organizations.** Participants also agreed to share technical assistance in a number of areas. This technical assistance would be provided as appropriate through institution-to-institution contacts, joint missions, and electronic networking. Technical assistance areas would include to facilitate the:
  - Setting up of units or departments for the promotion of democracy in other regional and multinational organizations, where such an entity does not currently exist;
  - Sharing of lessons learned more widely among organizations on key types of democracy programs (e.g. judicial reform, civil society) and consultations among organizations on these programs;
  - Development of an organizational grid of all the participating regional and multilateral organizations that readily indicates which organizations operate programs in which program areas (e.g. election monitoring, human rights). This grid would be used as the basis for

trying to reduce overlap between organizations and lay out more clearly areas of comparative advantage by organization.

## 2. ACTION AGENDA FOR NEW AND STRENGTHENED INSTRUMENTS TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY

While the policies and programs of international organizations to support and defend democracy continue to expand, participants identified the need to develop new tools and refine old ones to respond to the contemporary threats to democracy. There was widespread discussion on developing new and strengthened instruments to support democracy or prevent its rupture. These included the following proposals:

- ❑ Develop an **Inter-American Democracy Charter** that would provide clear “rules of the game” of actions in response to the interruption of democracy, strengthening the OAS’s resolution 1080. This new proposal by Peruvian Justice Minister García-Sayán;
- ❑ Create a **cadre of trained mediators** able to assist countries under threat of an interruption of democracy;
- ❑ Develop **early warning systems** to detect countries nearing a democratic crisis so that early intervention and assistance can be provided. The key characteristics of such systems with respect to detection, interpretation, evaluation and remediation were advanced in the conference.
- ❑ Develop a **comprehensive index of elements of democracy**, to reflect a broader concept of democracy in keeping with the principles contained in the Warsaw declaration, UDHR, ICCPR and regional democracy/HR instruments;
- ❑ Create **joint protocols on election monitoring** so that organizations mutually recognize and agree on the minimum requirements necessary for fair electoral monitoring, again reflecting international standards mentioned above; and,
- ❑ **Enhance existing instruments and democracy clauses** by, for example, improving the linkage between democracy clauses and economic benefits; and, broaden existing instruments to apply not only to ruptures but to cases of deterioration of democracy.

## 3. ACTION AGENDA FOR GREATER OUTREACH AND NEW AREAS OF ASSISTANCE

Participants also identified a number of emerging areas of need where new programs or assistance might be developed to respond to the emerging challenges

to democratic development. These included exploring the possibility of providing assistance in the following areas:

- **Democratic Culture.** Speakers stressed the importance of inculcating democratic values and culture as the greatest safeguard against democratic reversal over the long term. A number of participants felt greater attention needed to be placed on developing new and innovative curriculums that could be widely shared. Education for Democratic Citizenship, which is in use in all 34 European nations, was offered as a potential best practice case for application to other regions.
- **Minority Rights/Reducing Ethnic Conflict.** Participants noted the paucity of study and program development in the more recent threats to democracy from ethnic conflict, racism, infringement on the rights of minorities, and indigenous rights. This would require greater study and sharing of experiences to examine a framework for international assistance and more extensive work with civil society.
- **Political Participation and Party Development.** Bengt Soderbergh of IDEA noted that throughout the world political participation was declining, particularly among the young. Democracy support in the 21st century, it was proposed, will need to provide greater attention on strengthening the basic structures of democracy: political parties and political participation.

It was also agreed that new efforts to reach out to a larger group of actors and develop diverse methodologies would have important dividends. These included recommendations to:

- Work more extensively with civil society organizations;
- Utilize new technologies in the advancement of democracy;
- Hire more local, rather than international personnel to implement programs to help build local capacity; and,
- Increase cooperation and complementarity of democracy support programs with development assistance, including with multilateral donor and lending institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IDB, and Asian and African Development Banks.

## MOVING FORWARD

Together these conclusions and agreements provide a more defined starting point for greater collaboration and exchange among the world's leading regional and multinational organizations supporting the promotion and defense of democracy. These initial collaborations will be further advanced through the follow-on conference sponsored by the OSCE to be held in late 2001/early 2002.

The next conference will offer an opportunity for regional organizations to report progress towards implementing the recommendations elaborated in this report, specifically to carry out the action agenda in sections I-III, outline additional challenges and areas for further study, and work towards a deepened set of next step actions.

It is important to reaffirm that the agreements from the Washington conference form a starting point, not a roadmap. The representatives of the participating multinational and regional organizations fully recognized the need to redefine and reshape their support for democracy continually – as democracy itself comes under different challenges, as organizations learn better how best to support democracy, and as regional differences and understandings are bridged. It is a process with no end point. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recalled to the conference the words of Thomas Jefferson: “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance.” For the Community of Democracies, she added, the contemporary corollary is that “The price of liberty requires eternal effort.”