

BURKINA FASO

1. PRESENTATION¹

Basic Facts ²	
Name of Country	Burkina Faso
Capital	Ouagadougou
Population	13,902,972 million (July 2006)
Area	274,200 sq km
Average Life Expectancy	48.85 years (2006 estimate)
Ethnic Groups	Mossi over 40%, Gurunsi, Senufo, Lobi, Bobo, Mande, Fulani
GDP per capita, PPP	\$1,300 (2005 est.)

Community of Democracies	
Previous Participation	Warsaw 2000: Participant Seoul 2002: Observer Santiago 2005: Observer

Timeline of Recent Major Events in Burkina Faso

- **1999** June - President Blaise Compaoré sets up a committee of elders to look into unpunished political crimes committed in Burkina Faso since independence.
- **1999** August - Opposition and human rights leaders advocate for an end to the culture of impunity in Burkina Faso before agreeing to a government of national unity proposed by the government.
- **2001** February- A former presidential guard is indicted for the murder of journalist Norbert Zongo.
- **2001** September - New body set up to oversee elections in Burkina Faso includes opposition parties as well as non-governmental organisations.
- **2002** June - Burkina Faso creates a ministry for human rights promotion.
- **2003** October - Norbert Tiendrebeogo, leader of the opposition Social Forces Front (FFS) party, is arrested in connection with an alleged coup plot.
- **2005** August-October - President Compaoré announces his intention to run for re-election (third term). Opposition forces unsuccessfully contest his eligibility.
- **2005** November - President Compaoré wins a third 5-year term in office.
- **2006** February - General strike is called by independent trade unions, affecting an estimated 60,000 public employees.
- **2006** July - Rights groups in Burkina Faso are outraged over the dismissal of charges against the former head of the presidential guard in connection with the 1998 murder of prominent journalist Norbert Zongo.

¹ Principal Author: Center for Democratic Development - Ghana

² Source: CIA World Factbook at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>, accessed on 11 July 2006.

2. BACKGROUND

Ever since achieving independence from France in 1960, Burkina Faso has suffered political instability, including several military coups and recurrent civil strife. One significant conflict was the 1983 coup led by Captain Thomas Sankara, who attempted to remodel the country and its society on the basis of a social revolutionary programme. Democratic transformation was initiated in 1987, after political and social crises had provoked a military overthrow and the murder of Sankara, and one of the initiators, Blaise Compaoré, had taken over power. In 1991, the formation of numerous new parties was tolerated and legalised. Only then were substantial reforms considered because of strong internal pressure, which was mainly exerted by the unions. Opposition forces called for a boycott of the referendum for the constitution, which the Burkinabè, nonetheless, approved with a low voter turnout in July 1991. The first presidential elections in that same year led to further opposition boycotts. The only candidate running, Compaoré, was returned to office with only 25 percent of the electorate participating.

In the first parliamentary elections in 1992, Compaoré's *Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (CDP) achieved a two-thirds majority *vis-à-vis* a weak opposition. The president's party repeated its success with an even bigger landslide victory in the legislative elections five years later. This dominance of the ruling party and a weak opposition turned out to be one of the biggest obstacles facing the democratic process during this period. The control function of parliament remained theoretical, and work in the National Assembly was reduced to a one-party affair. Party opposition had started to form outside of parliament, and the institution began losing its credibility with the population. Although the human rights situation had improved, state terror and violence did not disappear under the new government. Impunity and a weakness of the rule of law have therefore prevailed.

Compaoré had hoped to strengthen his legitimacy shortly after being re-elected as president in 1998 on the basis of a relatively high voter turnout. However, he was faced with a crisis that not only further revealed the regime's authoritarian character but also contested the legitimacy of the president as well as of the political system as a whole. The crisis centered on the presumably state-ordered assassination of Norbert Zongo, founder and director of *L'Indépendent*, Burkina's most influential private weekly. *Trop c'est trop!*³ quickly became the slogan of an increasingly radical opposition movement, which demanded justice not only in the Zongo case, and denounced the deficiencies of the rule of law and the lack of political accountability, as well as the deteriorating living conditions experienced by most Burkinabè. The enduring internal pressure forced Compaoré to make concessions in order to reduce the tensions. Two political commissions' suggestions brought forward hitherto unknown political dialogue between the ruling coalition and the opposition, which finally resulted in the adoption of numerous institutional and electoral reforms. The creation of the Independent Electoral Commission and the revisions to the electoral code, in particular, represented a qualitative improvement from the previous system.

³ Too much is too much!

BURKINA FASO

The legislative elections in May 2002 reorganised the political balance of power as the ruling party could defend its absolute majority only by a narrow margin (57 out of 111 seats). For the first time since the inception of the electoral process in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represented a serious political group. Since then, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire has greatly affected the political and economic situation in Burkina Faso. The CDP regained some strength due to reinforced divisions within the opposition as well as a patriotic wave which swept Burkina following the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Burkinabè fleeing the Côte d'Ivoire civil war. This gave the Compaoré government and its ruling party the opportunity to pose as defenders of the national interest. After an intensive debate over the constitutionality of Compaoré's candidacy, the Burkinabè enabled the Compaoré presidency a third term by voting for him with more than 80 percent in November 2005.⁴

3. ANALYSIS

The constitution of 1991 generally provides the necessary framework for a functioning and stable democratic system based on the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Various kinds of restrictions, however, have hindered the development of democracy and have stopped it from taking root in the regime and in society at large. Some difficulties are due to the constitution itself, but most obstacles are caused by the authoritarian style of the Compaoré government.

Democratic Institutions and Processes

Including the 2006 polls, the country has conducted nine elections in 15 years. Until the 2002 polls the election processes lacked credibility and were characterized by an overwhelming dominance of the ruling party and a weak opposition that, for the most part, boycotted political participation within the institutional setting.

In 2002, the government made concessions as a consequence of the high pressure for reforms by Burkina's civil society and the opposition. These concessions included the installation of an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), the adoption of electoral reforms in favour of a proportional representation system, a single ballot voting system as well as the provision of public party financing. The result was a considerably higher participation in the 2002 legislative elections and a broader representation of the opposition. This, at the same time, raised the hope for an increasingly inclusive and democratic political system.⁵ The parliamentary majority, however, still remained with ruling party CDP, which used it to push through several amendments to the electoral code briefly after the elections, favouring again larger parties and thereby the governing CDP. Moreover, the independence of the CENI was reduced by granting the Ministry of Interior a more direct role in this nominally independent body responsible for the organization of elections.

⁴ Santiso/Loada 2003; Speiser 2006; EIU 2005; EIU 2006

⁵ NDI 2004, p. 4-5

All these measures have to be seen as part of the government's and ruling party's strategy to lay the necessary ground for securing the re-election of Compaoré as President in November 2005, and to avoid a repetition of the setback the CDP suffered in May 2002. Compaoré and the CDP pursued this aim aggressively, and even resorted to tactics of intimidation of political opponents. Moreover, the CDP used its dominance of the state administration and its better access to infrastructure and resources extensively for a countrywide expensive campaign none of the other candidates and parties were able to compete with.⁶

At the same time, the opposition again lost the unity that had provided the basis for the May 2002 successes, and found itself fragmented and busy with infighting as never before. To the voters, the opposition neither offered a clear strategy nor a credible alternative for the Presidential elections. All this favoured the re-election of Compaoré as President with more than 80 percent of the votes in November 2005. Blaise Compaoré's legitimacy was strengthened by the fact that it was the first genuinely pluralistic presidential poll. The voter turnout of only 57.5 percent, however, partly reflected a declining public interest in the political process.⁷ The popular expectations for improved political competition and more effective representation of voter interests had been high after the 2002 elections. Today, however, many citizens continue to be marginalized from the political process, while political parties have largely failed to take on and represent voters' interests. Particularly the citizens on the provincial level have been excluded from the political discussion and processes, which mainly took part in the urban areas.⁸ Local elections were finally conducted in April and July 2006, officially finalizing the country's decentralization process. As of now, it is too soon to predict whether this might lead to an empowerment of the local population.

The CDP's change of the electoral code provided a huge advantage for the ruling party in the municipal elections, by which it gained three-quarters of the provinces' seats with only 60 percent of the vote. A low voter turnout of only 49 percent in April 2006 as well as the need to repeat the local elections in 57 constituences (after fraud and irregularities were attested by the Constitutional Court)⁹ tarnished the credibility of the election process.

Political competition: Political parties and civil society

A new political party law has since 2001 regulated the function, authorization and duties of political parties in more detail than the previous one, but maintains its basically liberal character. The foundation of parties is not subject to many restrictions, as demonstrated by the registration of more than 100 parties. The party system is highly fragmented and the level of organisational stability is low. The system lacks

⁶ EIU 2005, September, p. 7, 12-17

⁷ EIU, 2006, March; IRIN, 18 November 2006, *Compaoré wins new mandate in country's first multiparty race*; IRIN, 14 November 2006, *Blaise Compaoré, a president on a quest for legitimacy*.

⁸ NDI 2004, p. 5

⁹ EIU 2006, September, p. 12-13

programmatic capacities and shows grave weaknesses *vis-à-vis* the population's social integration and political education. Parties therefore can only partially fulfil their constitutional role. However, the politicization of ethnicity or religion is rare in Burkina Faso.

The party financing system was also modified in 2001, regulating the state's allocation of funds according to proportional representation and equality with an improvement for the small parties.

The opposition could neither profit from the huge dissatisfaction among the Burkinabè population, which suffers from poverty, poor public services, and unemployment, nor manage to use its strong position in the legislature to further gain political ground. Instead, internal struggles and the personalized agenda of opposition leaders created an unattractive image of a weak and divided opposition, which looked incapable of running the country. Some opposition parties even supported the Compaoré candidacy; others failed to unite around a single presidential candidate.¹⁰

Unlike political parties, the civil society groups had been able to integrate large parts of the population, and contributed significantly to democratic awareness. Following the tradition of a strong and vital civil society dating back to the country's independence, its power and influence increased during the unstable years after the Zongo murder. It has provided a counterbalance to the government, a function not fulfilled by the weak parliament and judiciary. It remains an important voice and major channel to express the vital needs and concerns of the population.

Rule of law

The deficient judicial system is the country's main impediment to strengthening democracy. Above all, it is a lack of independence and efficiency which disables the judiciary from translating the concept of the rule of law into public policy.

First of all, the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary is constrained by the selection procedure of its members. The executive has extensive appointment powers via the Ministry of Justice. The minister presides over the Council of the Judiciary, which proposes judges before their nomination by the minister of justice. Thus, the career of a magistrate is dependent on a political decision, and appointments commonly are made more along the lines of political color than on legal qualifications. Although the *principe d'inamovibilité* is positioned in the constitution, critical colleagues are reassigned to another job if they have become too 'inconvenient'. For this reason, political pressure on judges is high, and a fair number respond by refusing to deal with politically sensitive issues. Furthermore, the executive decides which cases are dealt with and which are refused. This explains the hundreds of unresolved cases on political and economic crimes involving Burkinabè. Even if a verdict has been pronounced, this does not guarantee that it will be executed according to the law.

¹⁰ EIU 2005, December

Technical shortcomings add to the malfunctioning of the judicial system. The institution is affected by considerable inefficiency. It may take months to get a simple certificate, and even up to four years to obtain the required documentation to execute a verdict. Lack of motivation among jurists, poor knowledge about the basic rules, as well as insufficient human resources in the justice sector and inadequate material, are reasons for this sluggishness.

All these conditions strongly favor corruption. The acceleration of a law case or the desired outcome, for instance, has its price. A professional intermediary organises the shuttle of bribes between the ‘customer’ and the relevant person in charge, thereby inciting previously law-abiding citizens to break the rules. Impunity does not only apply to delinquents outside the justice sector. Judges themselves do not have to fear sanctions if professional failure or corruptibility is uncovered. The dominance of impunity, as a consequence, creates frustration among citizens who have been deprived of their right to justice. Young judges united in the *Syndicates des jeunes avocats* intend to change the current situation. Provided with a better education – which is said to have improved and to have been largely free of political influence for the past few years – and a spirit of democratic transition which has grown over the years, a generational change among lawyers and judges provides hope for the system’s improvement.¹¹

The constitutionality of Compaoré’s candidacy for the presidential elections has been debated intensively in Burkina in 2004-2005. The opposition and several independent legal scholars protested that his third bid for power would violate the constitution. In 2001, Article 37 of the constitution was revised to limit the presidential mandate to a maximum of two terms. CDP leaders, however, have argued that such a term limit could not be enforced retroactively. The Constitutional Court rejected the legal challenges filed by the opposition, and confirmed the CDP’s interpretation of the law. Most of the court’s 11 judges politically favor the CDP, with three of its members being former cabinet ministers.¹²

A more independent stance of the judiciary, however, could be observed in the Constitutional Court’s ordering of partial repeat elections for July 2006 in 57 constituencies, in response to a plethora of legal challenges after the April 2006 municipal elections.

The separation of powers: Checks and balances

While the Burkinabè constitution provides for a separation of powers, it allows at the same time for a highly centralised presidential system by providing the president and the executive with broad powers *vis-à-vis* all other institutions. Parliament is equipped with only limited control functions, and the judiciary is heavily influenced by the executive.

¹¹ Interviews in Ouagadougou in April 2002, November 2003, and telephone interviews in October 2006.

¹² EIU, 2005, September, p. 18.

BURKINA FASO

The president nominates the prime minister, appoints the cabinet members, and can dismiss them based on his decision alone. The same applies to a possible dissolution of the National Assembly, which is not bound to any restrictions. The president also presides over the Council of Ministers and is therefore assured of a strong position in government. He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, head of the Superior Council of Magistrates and has the power to decree amnesty.

Parliament's legislative powers are confined by the government's right to change any bill submitted by the legislative without debate, as well as its right to determine the parliamentary agenda. Therefore, parliament degenerated into the government's convenient rubberstamp. Parliamentary inactivity is also due to the inexperience of legislators, with no appropriate apparatus available for fulfilling their job properly. Parliament's control function primarily is confined to interpellation by means of written or oral questions as well as a limited right of co-determination in budget affairs, not including the power to block the budget's adoption.¹³

Corruption

Burkina Faso suffers heavily under the burden of endemic corruption. It is a major impediment to further democratization, as well as to an improvement in the well being of the broader population and of the country's economy. As mentioned above, corruption heavily discredited the justice system. It is an instrument of the ruling class, used to perpetuate the neo-patrimonial patronage system which keeps them in power and which protects their private political and economic interests from any interference. Corruption has affected every sector of Burkinabè society, and is thus jeopardising the state's credibility and its capacity to function properly.¹⁴

Human rights

The Burkinabè constitution guarantees civil and political rights in their entirety, but in many instances a gap exists between the written law and its application.

Although the government has tried to improve its human rights record over the last years, the general culture of impunity among members of the ruling elite and the security forces remains a huge problem. Apart from the Presidential Guard, which acts as an autonomous security force, members of the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police have been responsible for the deaths of civilians, criminal suspects, and detainees. Repeatedly, security forces executed suspected criminals, often by instruction of political authorities. Many Burkinabè consider such action to be acceptable, as the judiciary cannot cope with the growing number of criminals.¹⁵ There have been no known politically motivated killings by the government since 2005. At the same time, however, the executive's strong influence on the courts impedes fair trials. Arbitrary arrest and detention without due process, often applied to "difficult" political opponents, are part of

¹³ Interviews Ouagadougou, April 2002 and November 2003.

¹⁴ REN-LAC, 2005.

¹⁵ Telephone Interview, October 2006.

BURKINA FASO

the regime's strategy. Witnesses and criminal suspects have been known to die in police custody under unexplained circumstances. Prison conditions are harsh (overcrowding, poor diet, and minimal medical treatment). Prison authorities repeatedly have played a questionable role in the abuse or death of prisoners. Corruption among security forces, particularly among the lower ranks of the police, remains a serious problem.¹⁶

The government at times restricted the right to strike and demonstrate, but with limited success. Some marches by civil society groups were forcibly dispersed by security forces. Human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. International human rights organizations were permitted to visit and operate in Burkina, and the country's most important human rights group, MBDHP, was affiliated with the Inter-African Human Rights Union.¹⁷

Freedom of the press is largely guaranteed. State-operated media outlets have a significant pro-government bias, but a multitude of private media operate with little governmental interference and are often highly critical of the government. Nonetheless, critical journalists run a high personal risk as soon as highly sensitive issues are touched upon. The authorities have at times restricted the media's activities and have intimidated journalists into practising self-censorship. This happens, for example, by way of periodic police harassment or by offering separate payments in the so called *L'enveloppe khaki* for adequate media coverage of events – a standard practice in Burkina Faso. Journalists generally are not well paid and lack professional standards, mostly due to limited education available in this field. Under the 1993 information code, media outlets may be summarily banned if they are accused of distributing false information or endangering national security. The latter was invoked in connection with the arrest and detention of the editor of a pro-opposition weekly and one of the leaders of an opposition party in 2004, after he reported on escalating tensions between the Ivorian government and rebel forces.¹⁸

Burkina Faso has ratified many international instruments protecting women's rights, and has also worked to harmonize its national legislation with these ratified instruments. Nevertheless, women suffer violations of their rights both within the family and in society. Domestic violence against women occurs frequently, having its roots in Burkina's patriarchal society. Domestic violence is not specifically addressed by the law, but is usually handled through customary law and practice. While women represent about 45 percent of Burkina Faso's workforce, they face discrimination in the areas of education, job opportunities, family rights and property. In rural areas, land and commodity belong to men only. Widows therefore face a particularly bad fate. In many cases, they have to leave their community without any possessions, even without their children who have to stay with the husband's family. In 1996, female genital mutilation

¹⁶ Department of State, 2006.

¹⁷ Department of State, 2006; Freedom House, 2006, Freedom in the World.

¹⁸ Freedom House, 2005, Freedom of the Press; Freedom House, 2006, Freedom of the Press; Freedom House, 2006, Freedom in the World; Department of State, 2005; Interviews in Ouagadougou, November 2003, telephone interview October 2006.

BURKINA FASO

(FGM) was criminalized, and a noticeable governmental campaigning to eradicate it led to a significant reduction in this practice. Nevertheless, up to 70 percent of the female population still has to undergo this procedure.¹⁹

Child labor and child trafficking continue to be a problem, as Burkina Faso is a source, transit, and destination country. While trafficking seems to have increased as a result of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina's government has initiated measures to address the problem.

Burkina Faso is ethnically and religiously diverse. However, there is a high level of tolerance between the different groups, which is one of the country's strengths. There is hardly any correlation between religion, ethnicity and political affiliation. Unfortunately, ethnic tensions have grown since the outbreak of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the return of some 600,000 Burkinabè who have been forced to flee from the neighboring country.

4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Burkina Faso continues to experience various deficits in its democratization process. The excessive power of the executive and the almost non-existence of separation of powers are but a few examples. This notwithstanding, the country has put in place some of the basic structures needed for democratic progress.

The major reason for political shortcomings on the way toward democracy is to be found in the highly centralised presidential system, as a very dominant executive thwarts a functioning system of checks and balances. The virtually unconfined influence on the security apparatus, on the judiciary, and on parliament has far reaching consequences: the abuse of power by a small elite, which does not shy away from violence and crime if it comes to the protection of its privileged position; a culture of impunity and corruption in all parts of society, which advances the weakening of state institutions; a deficient rule of law; and a parliament that does not counterbalance the power of the executive, in which the opposition does not offer any real political alternative.

Political institutions in Burkina Faso do not offer a sufficient forum for the articulation and expression of political and social grievances, a dangerous situation that could push the growing opposition to locate itself outside political institutions, hence endangering the country's relative stability. There are already signs that sectors of the radical opposition may be tempted to turn to non-electoral and violent forms of political action.

Civil society, in this regard, seems to face a dilemma. On the one hand, there is an obvious discontent with the government and the president, as too little was done to improve the overall living standard. On the other hand, the notoriously weak opposition does not offer any convincing alternative, and despite the shortcomings of Compaoré's

¹⁹ Freedom House, 2006, Freedom in the World; MBDHP, 2005, p. 3-5; Department of State, 2005.

BURKINA FASO

government, it has over many years guaranteed a level of stability in a country surrounded by fragile states or conflict-ridden neighbours. Disillusionment about politics and a declining public interest seem to be a common reaction to this ambivalent situation.

Substantial improvements are needed to keep Burkina on its democratic path. The government and the state institutions need enhanced legitimacy through more transparent and accountable politics, and a real and far reaching reform agenda. In concrete terms, this means:

- The rule of law should be strengthened and the functioning of the justice system should be improved. Enhanced human, financial, and technical capacities will be of great importance in this regard, but most important is the formal and de facto independence of the judiciary.
- The fight against corruption has to be a top priority not only for the government but also for donor programs. Enhanced transparency and accountability is needed in all areas of Burkina's political, social and economic life. As corruption is deep-rooted, the successful fight against it will require a long-term approach. Concrete and comprehensive results can only be expected if the neopatrimonial structures are weakened and political behaviour changed.
- The government should allow for an electoral reform process. A more proportional representation and more inclusive politics are necessary. In this context, an improved system of checks and balances is also needed. Only then, will the state institutions be strengthened. It will therefore be of great importance to build capacity within parliament to counterbalance the massive power of the executive. Also, major improvements are needed with regard to understanding the role and the workings of the political opposition.
- An independent commission should be established to examine all allegations of Burkinabè interference in African countries. The Compaoré government has never acknowledged its role in the neighboring countries' conflicts, but it has suggested that whatever links it may have had in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the recent past, it now supports regional peace efforts. Assuming that this is based on true facts, Burkina's stabilizing role as a peacemaker should not only be supported, but steadily be called upon by its African and international partners.
- All relevant actors in Burkina should avoid strictly playing the nationalistic or ethnic card, as was the case with regard to the Ivorian civil war. Avoiding the use of ethnicity as a political instrument has always been the strength of Burkinabè politics, and reduced the risk of conflicts comparable to those many of its regional neighbours encountered.

5. COUNTRY STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Burkina Faso	Key
Voice and Accountability	35.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and

BURKINA FASO

		accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	42.9	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	32.5	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	35.6	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	38.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	58.1	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Burkina Faso	Key
Political Rights	5	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	3 ↑	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of civil liberties; higher value indicates bad system civil liberties)
Status	PF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free) / (*) Indicates electoral system

Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2006	Burkina Faso	Key
Total Score	38/ PF	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates total free press; higher value indicates less freedom) / 3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Burkina Faso Score	Key
Stateness	8.5	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	6.3	
Rule of Law	4.0	
Stability of democratic Institutions	6.5	
Political and Social Integration	5.3	
Total Score Political Transformation	6.12	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑Improved; ↓Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	4.42	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)

Corruption Perceptions Index 2006	Burkina Faso	Key
-----------------------------------	--------------	-----

BURKINA FASO

Total Score	3.2	Range 0-10 (lower value indicates high corruption; higher value indicates lower values of corruption)
-------------	-----	---

6. SOURCES

Reports

- Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006, “Country Reports: Burkina Faso”, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, Germany. <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/84.0.html?L=1>
- CIA, The World Fact Book. Retrieved from URL: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uv.html>
- Freedom House, 2005 & 2006, Freedom in the World <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006>
- Freedom House, 2005, “Burkina Faso Country Report.” Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2005&country=6705>, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2005>
- Freedom House, 2006, Freedom in the World <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006>
- Global Witness, 2003, The Usual Suspects. Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.
- International Crisis Group (ICG), 2003, Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over, ICG Africa Report N°72, Freetown/Brussels
- International IDEA, “Democracy in Burkina Faso: Assessment Mission Report; Dialogue for Democratic Development”, Capacity-Building Series 5, English Edition, 1998.
- Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (MBDHP), 2005, An alternative Report by the MBDHP on Burkina Faso’s 4th and 5th combined periodic reports submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, July 2005, New York
- Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (MBDHP), 2003, Rapport sur l’état des droits humains au Burkina Faso, Période: 1996-2002, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), Mission d’évaluation des Partis politiques au Burkina Faso, du 4 au 15 juillet 2004, Rapport d’évaluation http://www.accessdemocracy.org/NDI/usr_search.asp?SearchType=adv&DocURL=doc&DocType=0&RC=119&TS=0&Author=0&Publisher=0&Date=0&keywords
- REN-LAC, 2005, Etat de la Corruption au Burkina Faso, Rapport 2005
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2005 & 2006, Country Reports March/June/September/December
- U.S. Department of State, 2005, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Burkina Faso <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61556.htm>
- World Bank, 2005 Governance Indicators, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/tables.asp>

BURKINA FASO

Online News Sources

- Afrol News: http://www.afrol.com/countries/burkina_faso/news
- BBC News, 2006. Retrieved from URL:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1032616.stm
- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1032662.stm
- Jeune Afrique: <http://jeuneafrique.com>
- L'Independent: <http://www.independant.bf/>
- L'Observateur Paalga <http://www.lobservateur.bf>
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:
<http://www.irinnews.org/>

Articles & Books

- Santiso, Carlos/ Loada, Augustin, 2003, Explaining the unexpected: electoral reform and democratic governance in Burkina Faso, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 3, pp. 395-419
- Speiser, Dunja, 2006, Burkina Faso, in: Mario Petri/ Ulrich Schnier/ Jürgen Bellers (Ed.), Handbuch der transitorischen Systeme, Diktaturen und autoritären Regime der Gegenwart, LIT Verlag Berlin, pp. 171-176