

ZAMBIA - WATCHLIST

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION¹

General elections took place in Zambia on 28 September, 2006. President Levy Mwanawasa obtained a second presidential term with 43% of the vote, compared to the 29% obtained by his main rival, Michael Sata. Although the elections were generally praised as fair and transparent by international observers (EU, AU, Commonwealth, EISA), Mr. Sata challenged the results alleging that as many as 400,000 votes had not been counted in areas where he was expected to do well (northern Zambia). Two days of violent clashes between the police forces and supporters of Mr Sata's Patriotic Front followed the announcement of the final results. Although the situation seemed to have stabilized in early October with the naming of the new cabinet, President Mwanawasa publicly warned Mr. Sata that he could be charged with treason in light of his recent announcement to run a parallel government in areas that elected opposition councils. Political turmoil could be prolonged in the near future, spurred by Mwanawasa's fragile health after the minor stroke he suffered in April 2006.

MOST RECENT TRENDS

Zambia's evolution under President Mwanawasa, who has ruled the country since January 2002, has been praised by the international community as a notable improvement from his predecessor, Frederick Chiluba. Although their Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) has been in power since 1991, Mwanawasa has only recently tried to reduce corruption, an effort that led to the prosecution of Chiluba. Some observers, however, accuse Mwanawasa of using the fight against corruption to decimate his political rivals and consolidate his personal power. Western donors have rewarded Mwanawasa for his economic record by canceling half of the country's foreign debt in the last two years. Nevertheless, poverty remains Zambia's main challenge, with 65% of the population living on less \$1 a day².

Institutional reform has been a source of recent friction in the country. The Constitutional Review Commission has been criticized as biased and manipulated by the government, which did not fulfill its promise to include opposition groups and civil society in the constitutional review process. The lack of transparency in the Commission's work prompted large protests in November 2005. The failure to adopt a new constitution before the recent elections has been viewed by many as a maneuver by Mwanawasa to hang on to power, avoiding a provision that would have required 50% plus one votes to win the presidency. Mwanawasa's first term has also been shadowed by credible allegations of fraud committed in the 2001 elections. Other areas where the government shows a poor record are opposition access to the media, incompetence of the National Electoral Commission, and harassment of journalists critical of the government (press freedom in Zambia is rated as not free by Freedom House). The efficacy of the judiciary also remains weak due to lack of funds, prison conditions are harsh, and women's rights are still severely attacked despite some positive legislation promoted by the government.

ASSESSMENT

The situation in Zambia has considerably improved under President Mwanawasa, hence the elevation in the country's invitation status in Santiago 2005 from non-invitee to participant. However, the Zambian government still confronts many democratic and human rights failures, with some deterioration since the last CD Ministerial.

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² Oxfam: http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060331_zambia

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STATISTICS AND INDICATORS

World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 2005	Score	Key
Voice and Accountability	36.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak voice and accountability; higher value indicates strong voice and account)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	45.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak political stability and high violence; higher value indicates opposite)
Government Effectiveness	19.6	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak government effectiveness; higher value indicates strong govt. effectiveness)
Regulatory Quality	26.7	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak regulatory quality; higher value indicates strong regulatory quality)
Rule of Law	34.3	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak rule of law; higher value indicates strong rule of law)
Control of Corruption	23.2	Range 0-100 (Lower value indicates weak control of corruption; higher value indicates strong control of corruption)

Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007	Score	Key
Political Rights	3	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of political rights; higher value indicates bad system political rights)
Civil Liberties	4	Range 1-7 (Lower value indicates good system of civil liberties; higher value indicates bad system civil liberties)
Status	PF	3 Categories: F (Free); PF (Partly Free); NF (Not Free)

Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006	Score	Key
Stateness	8.3	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development)
Political Participation	6.3	
Rule of Law	6.5	
Stability of Democratic Institutions	6.0	
Political and Social Integration	5.5	
Total Score Political Transformation	6.5	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates negative democratic development; higher value indicates positive democratic development) / Arrow shows trend in democratic development (↑Improved; ↓Worsened)
Total Score Political Management	5.52	Range 0-10 (Lower value indicates lower quality of political management; higher value indicates higher quality of political management)